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ABSTRACT 
 
The directive 2014/95/EU as regards to non-financial and diversity information by 
certain large undertakings and groups will bring the previously voluntary practice of 
corporate responsibility reporting under regulation in the European Union in 2017. The 
Global reporting initiative’s framework for corporate responsibility disclosures is the 
most recognized guideline for corporate responsibility reporting. With the endorsement 
from the new 2014/95/EU directive the GRI framework will most likely continue to 
grow as the most applied responsible reporting guideline.  
 
In light of the new directive it is seen appropriate to investigate the informational value 
the GRI reporting guideline currently has for investors making investment decisions in 
the stock market. This thesis examines the effect releasing a first GRI report has on firm 
long-term information asymmetry measured by a liquidity variable, the turnover rate. 
The study is conducted on Finnish data and consists of 117 publicly listed companies 
from the Nasdaq OMX Helsinki Stock Exchange between 2001 and 2014. Furthermore, 
it is studied to what extent the GRI framework is recognized by companies listed in the 
exchange during the same timeframe.  
 
The empirical methodology applies a fixed effects panel regression model where a 
binary GRI variable in addition to the control variables for firm size, stock price, 
leverage and profitability are regressed on share turnover rate. The empirical regression 
could not find any statistically significant evidence that initiating a GRI report in 
Finland between 2001 and 2014 affected firm turnover rate. In light of the results it 
cannot be supported that the GRI guideline inevitably lowers firm information 
asymmetry and that reports based on the guideline would inherently offer investors 
valuable information in the Nasdaq OMX Helsinki Stock Exchange. The possible 
reasons for this can stem from the fact that the disclosed GRI reports are not third-party 
verified for the accuracy of their contents leaving the framework vulnerable to corporate 
misuse.  
___________________________________________________________________ 
KEYWORDS: Information asymmetry, Global reporting initiative, voluntary 
disclosure, corporate social responsibility. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The concern for corporate effects on environmental and social matters has been a topic 
of academic conversation for over 50 years and corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
has been evolving into an integrated part of business regime for the past couple of 
decades. The traditional financial bottom line is slowly transforming into a triple bottom 
line where the social and environmental performance of business are also accounted for 
(Norman & MacDonald 2004). Corporate responsibility reporting is the means of 
reporting the social and environmental efforts of business and so far the reporting has 
been voluntary by nature. In 1997 a group of people begun constructing a standard that 
was directed to enable harmonized corporate social responsibility reporting practices 
across the globe. In 2000 this group had grown to be the Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI) when it launched its first responsibility reporting guideline, the G1. Now the GRI 
reporting guideline is living its fourth generation and an increasing amount of 
corporations have committed to the standard.  
 
Whilst corporate responsibility reporting is not yet considered a legally mandatory act 
the world seems to be moving into that direction. In 2014 the European Commission 
(EC) passed a new directive that will integrate responsible reporting to the reporting 
practices of the largest publically listed corporations within the European Union 
(2014/95/EU 2014). The GRI reporting practice is currently the most popular 
responsible reporting guideline and will probably continue to grow in consequence of 
the new European Commission’s directive 2014/95/EU. Therefore, it is only seen 
appropriate to investigate whether the GRI report is an efficient reporting standard. The 
approach used investigates whether corporations are able to reduce information 
asymmetries between their stakeholders by disclosing the GRI report. Also, the rate at 
which the GRI has gained popularity in corporate reporting practices and what kind of 
businesses have committed to the guideline is investigated. 
 
 
1.1. Introduction to the topic 
 
Literature on corporate voluntary disclosure, information asymmetry and corporate 
responsibility are in the center of this thesis. Corporations are required to disclose their 
annual financial information but some corporations have also committed to disclosing 
more than what has been set as the legal and regulatory minimum. Such disclosures are 
referred to as corporate voluntary disclosures. The academic research has been 
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interested in the motives and possible causal effects that voluntary disclosures may 
induce, since the ultimate purpose behind all corporate acts should be to increase 
shareholder wealth (Friedman 1970). The Global reporting initiative’s guideline falls 
into the category of voluntary disclosure. Academics have proposed that voluntary 
disclosures may reduce informational imbalance between market participants and thus 
lower market speculation upon company’s securities (Diamond 1985). Alleviated 
speculation can help to collapse the risk-protective measures market participants set up 
to price protect themselves against more informed investors (Glosten & Milgrom 1985). 
Such price protection often induces stock illiquidity (Diamond 1985, Welker 1995). The 
incentive for corporations to lower their information asymmetries may be to lower 
market speculation, increase the liquidity of their stock and thus attract investors willing 
enough to hold the stock (Kraus & Stoll 1972).  
 
Information asymmetry has been described as the informational imbalance between 
market participants i.e. between investors but also between the corporation and its 
shareholders (Glosten & Milgrom 1985). In high information asymmetry some market 
participants are more informed than others about the future returns of the business. In 
such situations the more informed participants will try to take advantage of their 
information and exploit the less-informed investors. In high information asymmetry 
market speculation is high and the less-informed investors price protect themselves with 
wider spreads, weaken the trade volume and eventually increase stock illiquidity. 
Therefore, information asymmetry is used as the determinant for the effects of voluntary 
disclosure in alleviating market speculation and imbalanced information (Amihud & 
Mendelson 1986). The effects of lowering information asymmetry have been researched 
to increase stock liquidity, since with less imbalanced information among investors the 
less illiquidity premiums are set when trading the stock (Leuz & Verrecchia 2000). 
Liquidity is therefore often used to proxy information asymmetry. Such measures as the 
bid-ask spread, daily dollar trading volume and the turnover rate have been used as 
liquidity measures, which all rely on determining how effortlessly the stock can be 
traded on the market (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000, Amihud 2002). The theory is that the 
more liquid the stock the easier it is to buy and sell at the market place. The increased 
liquidity can be induced when investors are less afraid of being in a weaker 
informational position and are thus less speculative (Kyle 1985). Increased liquidity 
thus enables investors’ confidence that they can buy and sell the security with little risk. 
For the corporation increased liquidity has been studied to lower their cost of capital 
(Diamond & Verrecchia 1991, Botosan 1997).  
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The Global reporting initiative’s guideline is directed to give companies a 
comprehensive framework to disclose their corporate responsibility and sustainability 
efforts (GRI b 2015). Since the reporting is based on choice the reporting guideline falls 
under corporate voluntary disclosure. Responsible disclosure is strongly related to 
corporate social responsibility, which begun to appear in academic discussion around 
the 1950’s. The motives and effects of both corporate social responsibility (CSR) and 
responsible reporting have evoked research in the area. In the beginning of the 1950’s 
corporate responsibility was seen as the duty of the businessmen from where it 
gradually evolved into being an expectation that stakeholders begun to demand from 
businesses (Bowen 1953, Carroll 1999). Social accounting was developed as a tool for 
corporations to gather information of their corporate responsibility and to help in 
disclosing this information (Abbott & Monsen 1979). Academic research has for 
decades attempted to find the benefits that responsible performance has on financial 
performance. Corporate responsible disclosures have been connected to corporate 
voluntary disclosures and Dhaliwal, Li Tsang and Yang (2011) studied the effects of 
non-financial disclosure on cost of capital. Also, information asymmetry and corporate 
responsible performance have been studied. Cho, Lee and Pfeiffer (2013) found 
empirical evidence that CSR performance can reduce information asymmetry, which 
was proxied by a liquidity variable. Schadewitz and Niskala (2010) conducted a 
research on the Finnish market with data spanning from 2002 to 2005 about the 
informational value of the GRI and found evidence that supported the role of 
responsible reporting in mitigating information asymmetries.  
 
 
1.2. Purpose of the study and intended contribution  
 
This thesis is an attempt to examine whether the information disclosed by abiding to the 
Global reporting initiative’s guidelines helps to alleviate information asymmetry among 
corporate stakeholders. The statistical methodology tests for the possible effects when a 
company releases its first GRI report. The proxy for information asymmetry is a 
liquidity variable: the monthly share turnover rate. Furthermore, the data gathered offers 
an excellent ground to examine what kinds of corporations have committed to the GRI 
guideline and how extensive the commitment is at the target stock exchange. 
 
The setting for this study is placed at the Finnish stock market. Finland is chosen since 
it is a developed western country with advanced corporate social responsibility 
practices. The Finnish government has listed in its government program for 2011–2015 
12 
an objective to become a forerunner in corporate social responsibility and actively 
supports local businesses in efforts towards complying with international norms in the 
area of corporate social responsibility (Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
2015). Moreover, as a member country in the European Union the Finnish corporate 
responsibility reporting will be affected by the passing of the 2014/95/EU non-financial 
disclosure directive in which the responsibility reports of large corporations go under 
regulation in 2017 (2014/95/EU 2014). This offers a unique opportunity to examine 
how well large corporations have committed to responsible reporting as well as the 
possible effects the reports may have on information asymmetry before the new 
directive goes into effect. 
 
The area of voluntary CSR disclosures and their effects on information asymmetry is 
rather new and most previous studies linking responsible disclosures to information 
asymmetry have been conducted on US data. Many European countries, especially the 
Nordics, have advanced practices in corporate responsibility, which creates an optimal 
environment to examine how the effects and practices of responsible disclosures have 
evolved. Finland offers a good cross-section being a Nordic country but also part of the 
European Union. This study therefore contributes to the existing body of research by 
examining whether voluntary responsible reporting affects information asymmetry and 
does this with non-US data. Also, the thesis investigates what kind of businesses listed 
in the Nasdaq OMX Helsinki Stock Exchange have taken up standardized responsible 
reporting before the reporting becomes regulated in the EU. The Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) is the most well-known and widely applied responsibility reporting 
standard and it is therefore taken under examination.  
 
 
1.3. Research question and hypotheses 
 
Previous literature has established a firm link between voluntary disclosures and 
information asymmetry. Some evidence exists that responsible corporate practices may 
enhance firm market performance by lowering the cost of capital or by mitigating 
informational imbalance. However, few studies have combined voluntary responsibility 
disclosures and information asymmetry. Encouraged by the results from previous 
literature this thesis examines whether voluntary responsibility reports following the 
Global reporting initiative (GRI) guidelines reduce information asymmetry after 
publishing the report for the first time. This effect is examined in long-term timeframe 
i.e. for six months after the release. This is since a new commitment to a reporting 
standard can be seen as a permanent alleviator of imbalanced information. Also the 
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extent to which and what kinds of companies in Finland have committed to the Global 
reporting initiative’s disclosures is of interest. These two research questions lead to two 
hypotheses: 
 
H1: An increasing amount of corporations have disclosed a responsibility report 
following the GRI guidelines in Finland between 2001 and 2014. 
 
H2: Releasing the GRI responsibility report for the first time lowers information 
asymmetry for companies listed in the Nasdaq OMX Helsinki Stock Exchange between 
2001 and 2014. 
 
 
1.4. Construction of the study 
 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. After introduction a closer look is taken at the 
previous literature related to the topic. This includes literature on corporate governance 
and corporate responsibility in the context of their effects on information asymmetry 
and some other related indicators. Next, in chapter three, an introduction to the field of 
corporate social responsibility, its history, development and current state is presented. 
Chapter three is intended to give a comprehensive review of how CSR has evolved into 
being a core factor within corporate strategies by the 21st century. Following in chapter 
four is a thorough introduction to responsibility reporting, its history, practices and 
current trends. Chapter four reviews the historical path that resulted in the demand for a 
global framework for responsible disclosure. Chapter five explains some most relevant 
financial literature referred to throughout the chapters including literature on voluntary 
disclosure, information asymmetry as well as liquidity. The empirical part of the thesis 
begins in chapter six with describing the data and the empirical methodology whereas in 
chapter seven the results of the statistical analysis are presented. Chapter eight 
concludes. 
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2. PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
 
The literature review takes a look at academic papers closely related to the subject of 
this thesis. Whilst the academic research conducted on voluntary disclosure, 
information asymmetry as well as corporate responsibility is extensive the aim of this 
chapter is to focus on those articles that are most closely related to the research 
conducted here. The reviewed studies intertwine all three research areas or parts of 
them. These papers have also been the inspiration for choosing the present topic. The 
papers below will give insight to how academics have attempted to link either 
responsible disclosures or responsible performance to information asymmetry as well as 
some papers close to such research. Chapter three and four instead concentrate on 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) and CSR disclosure research and chapter five 
gives a closer look at the standalone financial research conducted on voluntary 
disclosure and information asymmetry alone with a slight dedication to liquidity studies 
as well. 
 
 
2.1. Corporate governance 
 
Corporate social responsibility can be thought of as a branch of corporate governance 
and perhaps the first studies beginning to examine the corporate governance–
information asymmetry dilemma have inspired the corporate responsibility literature 
too. Some studies investigating corporate governance and information asymmetry are 
thus presented here. This branch of literature examines the different aspects related to 
corporate governance and firm performance and how these matters show in information 
asymmetry. Bad corporate governance practices can be prone to encourage self-
advantageous managerial decisions and ultimately lead to agency costs. Agency costs 
arise when the interests of shareholders and managers are not aligned.  
 
Chen, Chung, Lee and Liao (2007) connect poor corporate governance to bad disclosure 
practices and increased levels of information asymmetry. They hypothesize that poor 
corporate governance is reflected in higher agency costs and in higher information 
asymmetry and that this transfers to a wider bid-ask spread due to price protection by 
liquidity providers. They suggest that improved transparency and disclosure practices 
mitigate agency problems via helping investors and smaller shareholders to better 
understand different managerial decisions. They find significant evidence that better 
corporate governance, measured by rankings in the Transparency and Disclosure Study 
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(T&D, a study published by Standard and Poor’s in 2002), lowers information 
asymmetry and increases liquidity (Chen et al. 2007). 
 
Chung, Elder and Kim (2010) go back to the purpose of corporations trying to establish 
how corporate governance can increase shareholder wealth. They suggest that better 
corporate governance lowers information asymmetry and increases liquidity by 
improving financial and operational transparency. More transparent organization is seen 
to mitigate for example management’s shirking, concentration of power or distorting 
disclosure processes. The paper establishes the importance of lowering information 
asymmetries between insiders and outsiders, e.g. between large shareholders and 
smaller retail shareholders but also among different smaller investors. The liquidity 
measures used in the paper include quoted spreads, effective spreads and index for 
market quality. The study also accounts for measures proxying information asymmetry: 
the price impact of trades and the probability of information-based trading. Chung et al. 
(2010) also contribute to the corporate governance literature by constructing a corporate 
governance index, which they use as proxy for measuring internal corporate 
governance. The results drawn support the hypothesis that better corporate governance 
amounts to better liquidity and to lower information asymmetry across the different 
measures. Also, the results suggest that the adoption of more sufficient corporate 
governance standards may alleviate information asymmetries and improve liquidity. 
 
 
2.2. Corporate responsibility 
 
While chapter three of the thesis is devoted for reviewing corporate social responsibility 
more thoroughly here are presented those academic publications that most closely 
motivate the research conducted in this thesis. Whereas several studies exist on relating 
voluntary disclosures and corporate governance to information asymmetry and liquidity 
research extending this line of examination to corporate social responsibility and 
responsible disclosures is in its infancy. However, some studies come close to the 
subject chosen for the present paper investigating the performance of market-based 
measures against voluntary non-financial disclosure and corporate social responsibility. 
 
Schadewitz and Niskala (2010) produce a research extremely close to the one in this 
thesis and factually their paper partially motivated the chosen topic. Their research is 
focused on whether communication through responsible reporting affects firm 
valuation. The data is based between years 2002 and 2005 and as proxy for responsible 
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reporting they use the Global reporting initiative (GRI) disclosures published by listed 
Finnish companies. They motivate the practice of responsible reporting by noting that it 
can work as a tool in providing investors with information that may be absent from 
standard financial reports. Responsible reports can thus complement financial 
statements and offer information on, for example, human capital, corporate governance, 
possible environmental risks as well as environmental management. Schadewitz and 
Niskala employ a valuation model introduced by Ohlson (1995) and determine the 
market value of equity as a function of the book value of equity, accounting earnings 
and responsibility reporting. Their results support that in this setting GRI responsibility 
reporting is significant in the formation of firm’s market value. Such results encourage 
further studies to be conducted on the importance of responsible disclosures on market 
performance. Therefore, this thesis will take a closer look at whether the publication of 
a GRI report has grown in popularity since the study by Schadewitz and Niskala (2010) 
extending the time period from 2001 to 2014. Also, the study conducted here differs 
from that of Schadewitz and Niskala (2010) by only including the initiation of a GRI 
report and investigating its long-term effects on lowering information asymmetry. 
 
Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang and Yang (2011) examine how voluntary nonfinancial disclosure, 
as in corporate social responsibility reporting, affects the cost of equity capital. The cost 
of equity capital can be interpreted as the internal rate of return, or discount rate, that the 
market applies to firm’s future cash flows to determine its current market value (El 
Ghoul et al. 2011). The hypothesis presented in the paper matches closely the ones 
suggested by Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) as well as Leuz and Verrecchia (2000). 
These studies hypothesized that voluntary disclosure alleviates information asymmetries 
and thus lowers the cost of equity capital. The study is conducted on the initiation of 
responsible reporting practices, similarly to this thesis. However, their approach is more 
closely related to examining the changes in cost of equity capital when a firm decides to 
initiate a standalone corporate social responsibility (CSR) report. Their paper is among 
the first to study the effects of standalone CSR reports, which is a new type of setting as 
responsible performance indicators are often disclosed within annual reports. They find 
evidence that firms with better CSR performance are able to lower their cost of equity 
capital, attract better analyst coverage and are more likely to conduct seasoned equity 
offerings (SEOs). A further inference made from the results is that the possibility for 
lower cost of equity capital may motivate firms to begin disclosing responsible 
information. The study by Dhaliwal et al. (2011) is an important step in the research 
area of voluntary responsibility disclosures and their encouraging results offer excellent 
motivation to continue researching voluntary CSR disclosures.   
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El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok and Mishra (2011) also research the linkage between CSR 
and the cost of equity capital. El Ghoul et al. (2011) hypothesize, holding other factors 
fixed, that firms incorporating high CSR performance have lower cost of equity capital 
than firms with poor CSR performance. The hypothesis could be backed up by, for 
example, a difference in perceived risk for high and low CSR firms. El Ghoul et al. 
(2011) choose an implied cost of capital model. The implied cost of capital is vouched 
to allow for an attempt to separate the cost of capital effects from effects caused by 
growth and cash flows. The corporate social responsibility data is acquired from the 
KLD STATS database. The KLD database is one of the most used databases among 
empirical CSR research and is considered as one of the top sources of data for corporate 
social performance (Jiao 2010). El Ghoul et al. (2011) reach the result that firms with 
better corporate social responsibility scores achieve lower costs in equity financing. 
Additionally, involvement in so-called sin industries such as tobacco and nuclear power 
has an elevating effect on firm’s cost of equity. As a conclusion, the study finds a 
significant linkage between corporate social performance and the cost of equity capital. 
The authors reach the conclusion that by enhancing responsible actions firms can 
attempt to reduce their cost of equity financing. In addition to El Ghoul et al. (2011), the 
study by Goss and Roberts (2011) examines the effects corporate responsibility might 
have on the cost of bank loans; the other side of cost of capital. Their study finds a 
significant but modest linkage between the price of bank loans and corporate 
responsibility.  
 
The study by Cho, Lee and Pfeiffer (2013) is closely related to the topic of this thesis. 
They are among the first to link corporate social responsibility and information 
asymmetry but in contrast with the research conducted here they concentrate on CSR 
performance rather than disclosures. The paper uses the KLD STAT database as source 
for CSR rankings. Differing from other studies conducted with the KLD data (e.g. El 
Ghoul et al. 2011) Cho et al. divide CSR into positive and negative performance. For 
example, positive CSR performance can appear as better environmental management 
and negative performance as unnecessary pollution. Both performance indicators offer 
investors information on the company’s risk levels or possible changes in future 
earnings. Secondly, Cho et al. (2013) include an examination of how institutional 
investors affect the relation between CSR performance and information asymmetry. The 
paper uses the bid-ask spread as proxy for information asymmetry and controls for the 
level of institutional investors, size, leverage, stock price and stock return volatility. 
They find statistically significant evidence that CSR performance can reduce 
information asymmetry and more interestingly that the negative CSR performance has 
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greater impact. Furthermore, the results support that where there are large institutional 
investors with capacity to acquire private information on CSR performance, these 
investors exploit their positions ultimately attenuating the reductions in information 
asymmetry. All in all, Cho et al. (2013) open the door for research relating corporate 
social responsibility and information asymmetry. Their results encourage studying how 
responsibility in terms of disclosure might affect market indicators. 
 
A slightly different view to firm responsible disclosures is given by Aerts, Cormier and 
Magnan (2008). They study the implications of environmental disclosure both in 
European and North American context as well as account for both web- and print-based 
disclosures. Similarly in this thesis the responsible disclosure material is entirely web-
based and extracted from a European setting. Their paper also accounts for the public 
pressure for firms to disclose on their environmental performance and such pressure is 
proxied by the firm’s exposure to media. Furthermore, an analysis of the environmental 
disclosure’s relevance in financial markets is included where they measure the effect by 
errors in analysts’ forecasts. The results show that enhanced environmental disclosures 
may bring more precise earnings forecasts by analysts but is mostly relevant for 
companies with less extensive analyst following. The results were also more 
pronounced in the European setting. 
 
A very recent study by Kim, Li and Li (2014) examines if CSR performance can be 
related to lower stock price crash risk. While this study does not directly contain the 
aspect of information asymmetry or disclosure it is relevant in revealing how CSR 
performance can be used in investment decisions and risk management. The paper also 
contains a good reference to corporate greenwashing, which is a theory within CSR 
literature about exploiting corporate responsibility in attempts to conceal improper 
behavior. In the setting of stock price crashes greenwashing appears if managers 
continuously choose not to report bad news up until to the point where all the hidden 
information becomes public at once. The accumulated bad information reflects as a 
crash in stock price. The study uses corporate responsibility rankings from the MSCI 
ESG database and measures crash risk by the negative conditional skewness of firm-
specific returns. Their study finds a significant negative connection between CSR 
performance and stock price crash risk but expects that in these cases the firm has high 
level of transparency in financial reporting and is less prone to hoarding bad news.  
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3. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
As the thesis at hand is devoted to corporate responsible disclosures it is seen only 
suitable to include a section describing what is corporate social responsibility. This 
chapter takes a thorough look at when and how corporate responsibility became an 
important theme in organizational regime and who have been the most influential 
authors in the field. In addition to a historical review here are introduced some more 
recent trends seen in social responsibility as well as the measures developed along the 
way. Lastly, an intensive selection of academic papers examining the relation of 
corporate social responsibility and firm financial indicators is included in order to 
provide an more extensive view of CSR research and how the thesis at hand continues 
to complement it.  
 
 
3.1. Evolution of corporate social responsibility  
 
Corporate social responsibility has been defined in numerous ways throughout its 
existence. In its earliest forms corporate social responsibility was mostly referred as 
social responsibility (SR). In 1950’s social responsibility begun to emerge in scientific 
literature (Carroll 1999). Bowen (1953) is considered among the first to introduce 
corporate social responsibility and give CSR its initial definition. In his book Social 
responsibilities of the businessman Bowen assesses: “It refers to the obligations of 
businessmen to pursue those policies, to make those decisions, or to follow those lines 
of action which are desirable in the terms of the objectives and values of society” (1953: 
6).  
 
Further on, in the 1960’s and 1970’s, more precise and up to date descriptions of CSR 
begun to appear. Noteworthy names include Davis, who inclined that a well performing 
business requires a healthy society (1967: 46). A business is required to sacrifice profits 
in order to execute its social responsibilities. An idea originated that short-term 
expenses on social responsibility reward business with long term profits (Davis 1960: 
70). It is to be pointed out, that socially responsible acts were still in the 1960’s 
considered as the duties of the businessmen, not the business or corporation itself. An 
important development in the definition of CSR is its extension beyond economic and 
legal obligations, implying that social responsibilities rely on some degree of 
voluntarism (Carroll 1999).  
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During the 1970’s social responsibility became increasingly considered as a corporate 
act instead of an individual act. Davis characterizes corporate social responsibility as 
follows: “-- it [CSR] refers to the firm's consideration of, and response to, issues 
beyond the narrow economic, technical, and legal requirements of the firm. It is the 
firm's obligation to evaluate in its decision-making process the effects of its decisions on 
the external social system in a manner that will accomplish social benefits along with 
the traditional economic gains which the firm seeks” (1973: 312–313). An important 
notation is how Davis refers firms being the executive part when it comes to social 
responsibility. Therefore corporate social responsibility seems to have become a more 
correct term instead of just social responsibility. It is also to be pointed out how Davis 
ties corporate social responsibilities with the ability to sustain economic gains 
effectively differentiating it from sheer philanthropy.  
 
In contradiction to all the positive expectations loaded on corporate social 
responsibility, in 1970 Milton Friedman joined the CSR conversation with a 
controversial theory. According to Friedman (1970) the only social responsibility of 
business is to increase profits in order to maximize shareholder wealth. During the 
decade, also first attempts to empirically prove corporate social responsibility’s effects 
on stock performance were published by Moskowitz (1972) and Vance (1975).  
 
While the 1970’s and 1980’s mark the first decades of empirical CSR research, the 
1990’s is a decade when rather compatible themes evolved around CSR. These include 
such as the stakeholder theory and corporate social performance (CSP) (Carroll 1999). 
The stakeholder theory assumes that in addition to shareholders, corporations are 
responsible for other groups and individuals, which can affect or are affected by the 
accomplishments of organizational purpose (Freeman 1984: 25). In other words, 
according to stakeholder theory businesses are required to cherish their relationship with 
stakeholders in order to guarantee functional operations within all its interest groups. 
However, the before-mentioned ideas of Milton Friedman (1970) are contradictory to 
the stakeholder theory. The so called Friedman Doctrine, also known as the stockholder 
theory, highlights that increasing stockholders’ wealth is the only social responsibility 
of corporations (Friedman 1970). The stakeholder theory and the stockholder theory 
became more or less contested with one another resulting in an academic quarrel within 
the CSR literature. In chapter four the thesis takes a closer look at stakeholder theory in 
respect to social accountability and responsible reporting as it is considered one of the 
main theories within voluntary responsible reporting. 
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Figure 1. Stakeholder theory: Illustration of Stakeholders’ and corporation’s influence 
towards one another (Modified from Freeman 1984: 25.)  
 
 
Along the years corporate social responsibility has gone through definitional change and 
has evolved into a modern corporate strategy. Starting from the 1950’s with such 
outdated terms as the businessmen and coming all the way to 1990’s where CSR has 
been placed as a point of origin for other theories, such as the stakeholder theory. In 
addition to this, the academic literature remains active on the topic especially when it 
comes to measuring CSR. CSR continues to interest among academics, corporates and 
global organizations, and is increasingly expected by the public (Carroll 1999). In the 
beginning of the 21st century, CSR was no longer considered only a research subject 
among academic literature, but a pressing global matter.  
 
 
3.2. Global frameworks and current trends of CSR 
 
Corporate social responsibility has received a lot of attention in academic literature but 
global organizations have also taken part into the discussion. Several well-recognized 
organizations have given their own perceptions and guidelines on CSR during the past 
two decades. Such organizations include the European Union (EU), the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations (UN). It 
speaks for the importance and need of worldwide sustainability, for CSR to be 
acknowledged by these globally influential organizations.  
 
The European Commission published a new policy on corporate social responsibility in 
2011. The European Commission is responsible for running the day-to-day tasks of the 
European Union. It is responsible for proposing legislation and implementing decisions. 
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In this policy corporate social responsibility is defined as “the responsibility of 
enterprises for their impacts on society”. To fully meet their social responsibility, 
enterprises “should have in place a process to integrate social, environmental, ethical 
human rights and consumer concerns into their business operations and core strategy 
in close collaboration with their stakeholders” (EC 2011). In continuation of EU’s 
interest towards corporate responsibility the Commission passed a new directive in 2014 
that will transform the previously voluntary practice of responsible reporting to a more 
regulated regime (2014/95/EU 2014). This directive is reviewed more closely in chapter 
four. 
 
With the European Commission’s policy couple of other established guidelines and 
principles together form a coherent global framework for CSR. The other guidelines and 
principles include for example OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, The 10 
Principles of the United Nations Global Compact and ISO 26000 Guidance Standard on 
Social Responsibility. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises is a 
government-wide approved package that encourages multinational enterprises to 
exercise sustainable development and social responsibilities. The UN Global Compact 
determines a set of core values in socially responsible areas, such as the environment, 
anti-corruption and labor standards. Companies can sign up for the Global Compact and 
commit into submitting a progress report annually. The ISO 26000 standard is a set of 
voluntary recommendations on how organizations can operate in a socially responsible 
way. The standard is aimed for all organizations, not just businesses. Unlike other well-
known ISO standards, the ISO 26000 doesn’t award certifications. (EC 2013.)  
 
Even though universally applicable definition for CSR has not been established by the 
21st century, many currently used definitions have a lot of similarities. Altogether, CSR 
can be seen as an approach by which companies integrate social and environmental 
concerns in their business operations and in their interactions with stakeholders on a 
voluntary basis (IFC 2011). The important part of all definitions is how CSR actions 
should be an extension of corporation’s legal obligations (McWilliams & Siegel 2001). 
If this was not the case, then all firms would act responsibly only by abiding the law. In 
order to preserve prestige among firms that implement CSR practices voluntarily, a 
reach over corporation’s legal obligations must be a prerequisite for corporate social 
responsibility.  
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3.2.1. Terminology 
 
For the purpose of this paper it is seen fit to introduce some commonly used terms in the 
literature concerning CSR research. Most of the following terms introduced here have 
been developed during the past 20 years. Moreover, the following terms are actively 
used in the empirical research introduced later in this paper. In order to fully absorb the 
following chapters, understanding these terms is a necessity.  
 
Corporate social performance (CSP) is comprised of the configurations, which 
corporations use to implement corporate social responsibility. For example, the 
principles, which drive corporations’ social performance and the effectiveness of 
socially responsible processes, are in the core of defining CSP (Wood 1991). To get a 
practical idea of corporate social performance, lets say a chemical firm announces itself 
to be socially responsible. For instance the act of refraining from animal testing is the 
firm’s way to implement responsibility and this act can be seen as a part of the firm’s 
CSP.  
 
ESG, short for environmental, social and governance, is a term used to capture and 
measure the corporate social responsibility actions of businesses (Starks 2009). So 
called ESG factors are those derived from the explanatory terms of the acronym. For 
example, from the word environmental such factors as clean water and amount of 
pollution can be derived. Social factors could be for example human rights and child 
labor. With governance it is often referred to corporate governance of a firm. Corporate 
governance can be seen as the collection of control mechanisms that an organization 
adopts to prevent potentially self-interested managers from engaging in activities 
detrimental to the welfare of shareholders and stakeholders (Larcker & Tayan 2011). 
From a stakeholder perspective, corporate governance should support policies that 
produce stable and safe employment, provide acceptable standard of living to workers, 
mitigate risk for debt holders and improve the community (Larcker & Tayan 2011).  
 
Corporate social responsibility is distinctly a strategic viewpoint from the corporate 
perspective. So it is only appropriate that investors have their own perspective on 
socially responsible acts. Socially responsible investing (SRI) is considered an 
investor’s way to support the ethical values of businesses. SRI investors and ethical 
mutual funds also use the acronym ESG in the context of screening. That is, companies 
are screened with environmental, social and governance related factors in order to 
assess their acceptability for SRI portfolios (Monks & Minow 2011: 84). Socially 
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responsible investors commonly abandon such industries as tobacco, alcohol and 
gambling from their portfolios.  
 
Discussion has been placed on how well the revenue on a financial report, the so called 
bottom line, determines a good business. For example, if a business generated positive 
revenue whilst polluting heavily at some geographical area, how successful the business 
actually is? A concept called the triple bottom line (TBL) tries to account for profits on 
environmental and social level in addition to monetary profits. That is, the ultimate 
success or wealth should be measured not just by the traditional financial bottom line, 
but also by social and environmental performance (Norman & MacDonald 2004). TBL 
reporting can simply be seen as a way for corporations to bring their CSR efforts into 
public knowledge.  
 
Figure 2. Triple bottom line: By combining social, environmental and economic bottom 
lines corporation takes a step towards sustainability.  
 
 
3.3. Measuring corporate social responsibility 
 
This chapter introduces the most common measurements for CSR. For decades the 
quantification of qualitative information of different dimensions of responsible actions 
has been a challenge. However, in the 21st century with more advanced ways of 
collecting data three sources for measuring corporate responsibility emerge above 
others. These are The Domini 400 index (recently renamed to MSCI KLD 400 Social 
Index but here both names are used interchangeably) based on the KLD STATS 
database, FTSE4 Good index and SAM used by Dow Jones Social Index. The KLD 
database is considered the leading data source by academics and it is also among the 
first databases mapping CSR activities across businesses (Jiao 2010).  
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Domini 400 Social Index is recognized as a CSR benchmark. It is a stock market index 
for social responsibility (Becchetti, Ciciretti, Hasan & Kobeissi 2011). The Domini 
Index is created by an independent rating agency Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini 
Research & Analytics, Inc. (KLD). KLD upkeeps a database (STATS), which contains 
a wide range of CSR related ratings. The information in the database has been 
comprised of various sources such as government agencies, non-governmental 
organizations, global media publications, annual reports, regulatory filings, proxy 
statements, and company disclosures (El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok & Mishra 2011). The 
KLD database is one of the most used databases among empirical CSR research and is 
considered as one of the top sources of data for corporate social performance (Jiao 
2010). The KLD database has been used as a source of data for CSR ratings already in 
the 1990’s. Since then it has expanded extensively. At the beginning it comprised of the 
S&P 500 firms with the Domini 400 Social Index added later. Further on, indices such 
as the Russell 1000 Index, Large Cap Social Index and Russell 2000 and Broad Market 
Social Index, were added to the KLD STATS database (El Ghoul et al. 2011).  
 
FTSE4Good is an index mapping CSR performance of hundreds of firms around the 
world (Deng, Kang & Low 2013). The index is constructed by the Financial Times 
Stock Exchange with support from Ethical Investment Research Services (EIRIS). 
FTSE4Good Index was designed to measure and rank companies’ CSR activities and 
work as a useful tool for investors interested in constructing socially screened portfolios 
(Curran & Moran 2007). The index evaluates companies on social and environmental 
criteria in five categories: environmental sustainability, human rights, countering 
bribery, supply chain labor standards and climate change (Deng et al. 2013).  
 
SAM (recently renamed as RobecoSAM), also known as the Sustainability Asset 
Management Group GmbH, is an international investment company working as ESG 
research provider for the Dow Jones Sustainability Indices (DJSI). The companies 
chosen for the DSJI are evaluated by their economical, environmental and social 
activities. The Sustainability Asset Management specializes in sustainability research 
and is considered an industry leader in ESG research (Humphrey, Lee & Shen 2012). 
During the years SAM has constructed one of the most comprehensive CSR databases. 
It has some strengths over the KLD STATS, which rates corporate SR activities only on 
a binary scale. SAM offers a wider perspective on the effectiveness of CSR activities 
that companies execute compared to that of the KLD (Humphrey et al. 2012).  
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3.4. Research in corporate social responsibility 
 
A brief introduction to the research history in corporate social responsibility will help to 
motivate the research question of this thesis. Studies on corporate responsibility have 
been trying to link corporate responsible actions to financial indicators ever since the 
1970’s. Most research has been aimed towards linking CSR performance and market 
performance. Studies have also been conducted in the area of cost of capital and 
accounting performance. As results throughout studies have not been consistent in 
attempting to link CSR and market returns academics have turned to other measures, 
liquidity and information asymmetry being among them and expanding the literature to 
responsible reporting. This chapter will briefly introduce most relevant articles among 
CSR studies that have made way for the newest research questions. 
 
During the 1970’s first studies trying to prove corporate social responsibility’s effects 
on market performance were published. Moskowitz (1972) issued a paper where he 
attempted to prove that corporate social responsible strategies affect businesses 
positively. He believed that the vivid discussion around social responsibilities worked 
as a wake-up call for investors and that the stock market would thus favor more 
sustainable businesses. Moskowitz (1972) constructed a portfolio of 14 socially 
responsible companies. He measured the changes in value by examining capital gains 
and losses in the stock market. This portfolio achieved 7.28% increase in its value 
during the six-month evaluation period. In contrast to Dow Jones Industrial Index and 
New York Stock Exchange Composite Index Moskowitz’s (1972) portfolio beat the 
market by 2.18–2.88 percent. The 14 companies were handpicked by Moskowitz 
himself after four years of analyzing different businesses on the basis of consistency on 
social responsibilities. It is worth to mention that in 1970’s no databases or indices that 
measured CSR existed for investors to take advantage of in their portfolio construction. 
In his study Moskowitz (1972) also attempted to satisfy this information need of 
sustainably aware investors in addition to empirically measure corporate social 
performance effects on stock value. 
 
Even though conducting a pioneer research in responsibility Moskowitz (1972) became 
a subject of criticism. From the results of his study Moskowitz implied socially 
responsible stocks being good investment choices. However, Aupperle, Carrol and 
Hatfield (1985) noted that Moskowitz never revealed the criteria that he used in picking 
the 14 companies for his portfolio. He only assessed them to be socially responsible. 
This exposed Moskowitz’s study to subjectivity (Aupperle et al. 1985). More criticism 
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arose when Vance (1975) challenged Moskowitz’s (1972) hypothesis on the 
profitability of corporate social performance. In his article Vance first introduced data 
on stock returns for Moskowitz’s 14 company portfolio during 1972–1975. Almost all 
companies had performed considerably poorly compared to the Dow Jones and New 
York Stock Exchange indices on this time period. In the same paper Vance also 
introduced new empirical evidence on the linkage between CSR and market gains. He 
used two studies that ranked businesses according to their corporate social responsibility 
aspects. He then measured the capital gains of firms with high and low rankings. In 
contradiction to Moskowitz (1972), Vance (1975) found a negative correlation between 
CSR ranking and stock market performance during 1974. This result would support a 
theory that socially responsible firms are in a disadvantage resulted by their increased 
costs due to investments made in CSR (Alexander & Buchholz 1978). Since the results 
of Moskowitz (1972) and Vance (1975) were controversial, more researchers joined the 
quest to determine the financial impact of corporate social responsibility. 
 
Alexander and Buchholz (1978) found deficiencies in the studies by Moskowitz (1972) 
and Vance (1975). Both Moskowitz and Vance evaluated stock performance only for a 
short time period, six and 12 months respectively. In addition, neither of the studies 
took risk adjustments into account. Alexander and Buchholz (1978) thus revised 
Vance’s study with risk-adjusted values. They found no significant correlation between 
firm’s financial performance and corporate social performance. In addition, Alexander 
and Buchholz linked the efficient market theory by Fama (1970) into their study. 
According to the efficient market theory, they concluded that all positive or negative 
effects associated with CSR actions should instantly reflect in stock prices. Since their 
study did not observe any significantly different stock returns compared to the market, 
corporate social responsibilities were either not relevant information or the information 
was already reflected to the stock prices prior to their research (Alexander & Buchholz 
1978). 
 
Aupperle, Carroll and Hatfield (1985) attempted to measure the relationship of 
corporate social responsibility and profitability by using the so-called Carroll’s 
construct. Their aim was to create a more objective and empirical study compared to 
Moskowitz (1972), Vance (1975) and Alexander and Buchholz (1978). Even though 
Alexander and Buchholz took an advanced step towards reliable results by 
implementing risk adjustments to their study, Aupperle, Carroll and Hatfield (1985) saw 
the original sample data borrowed from Vance to be poor. The Vance study used 
reputational surveys from a subjective source and it had a response rate of only 11 
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percent. By using Carroll’s construct Aupperle, Carroll and Hatfield (1985) aimed to 
take the first step in standardizing empirical CSR research. According to their paper, 
many previous studies suffered from methodological issues, especially since no 
consistency in CSR measurement existed. It is to be pointed out, that in the 1980’s the 
exact definition of corporate social responsibility was not yet established. Carroll’s 
construct attempted to define and measure CSR by using four components: economic, 
legal, ethical and discretionary; the last is sometimes also referred to as philanthropy. 
After creating a forced-choice survey that measured the four components, it was sent to 
over 800 Chief Executive Officers and received a 30% response rate. A forced-choice 
method was used in order to minimize the social desirability of responses, that is, to 
minimize respondents’ bias. The results of Aupperle, Carroll and Hatfield (1985) failed 
to support the view that a relationship between corporate social responsibility and 
profitability would exist. Additionally, their study used return on assets (ROA) as a 
measure of profitability by which we can only draw conclusions about tangible value. 
ROA is an accounting based measure of the relationship between net income and total 
assets; it gives insight to how efficiently company’s assets are used to generate 
earnings.  
 
Towards the 1990’s the definition of corporate social responsibility got solidity based 
on Carroll’s construct, extending it over the legal obligations of business. Additionally, 
the different views of CSR’s effects on corporate performance became more precise. 
McGuire, Sundgren and Schneeweis (1988) presented three perspectives on the 
relationship between corporate social responsibility and corporate financial performance 
based on perspectives introduced in previous studies. According to their first 
perspective, firms using resources on CSR can suffer from financial disadvantage due to 
a rise in costs. For example the study by Vance (1975) supported this theory. The 
second perspective presents that costs in CSR are minimal and benefits generated, such 
as improved employee morale and productivity, reward the business for choosing a 
sustainable strategy. The thoughts of Moskowitz (1972) were closely aligned with this 
perspective. Third and newest perspective presented by McGuire et al. (1988) states, 
that the costs created by CSR are significant but reductions in other costs resulted by 
applying CSR offset the original costs.  
 
McGuire et al. (1988) had a new approach on the topic of CSP and CFP. Contrary to 
many previous studies, their study’s purpose was to measure whether previous financial 
performance had an effect on future socially responsible actions in addition to the 
traditional question of CSR’s effect on future financial performance. They derived a 
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theoretical argument based on the third perspective presented in the previous paragraph; 
by reducing risk via corporate social responsibility businesses can lower costly explicit 
expenses. For example, before the usage of asbestos in construction was prohibited by 
law, businesses could attempt to avoid future law suits by refraining from using 
asbestos as a responsible act. (McGuire et al. 1988.) By using Fortune magazine’s 
annual corporate reputational rankings as data for CSR, McGuire et al. (1988) tested 
their hypotheses on both accounting-based, such as ROA, and market-based 
performance measures, such as risk adjusted returns. The Fortune magazine survey 
rated companies on eight attributes using industry professionals in 20–25 different 
industry groups. The attributes used were: financial soundness, long-term investment 
value, use of corporate assets, quality of management, innovativeness, quality of 
products or services, use of corporate talent and community and environmental 
responsibility. With a response rate usually over 50% and the extent of the Fortune 
survey it had good grounds for objectivity. McGuire et al. (1988) also presented 
previous studies that confirmed the Fortune study to appropriately correlate with 
accounting- and market-based performance measures. The study of McGuire et al. 
(1988) suggested several conclusions. They found that prior financial performance is 
generally a better predictor of CSR than subsequent performance; firms with high 
performance and low risk can better afford to act responsibly. In addition, their results 
suggested that firms with low CSR, experience lower ROA and market returns than 
firms with high levels of social responsibility. Also, accounting- based measures proved 
to give better predictions of CSR than capital gains. (McGuire et al. 1988.) 
 
The study by Waddock and Graves (1997) is among the first to take advantage of the 
KLD database in assessing the levels of corporate social responsibility among 
corporations. The studies written at this time mark a beginning for a new period in CSR 
research. The first corporate social performance ratings created by KLD were done for 
the entire Standard and Poor’s 500, which consists of the 500 largest U.S. publicly 
traded companies. Another study by Griffin and Mahon (1997) was also among the first 
to use the KLD corporate social performance rankings. They additionally used the 
Fortune magazine reputational survey, which could be used as a reliability check for the 
study by McGuire et al (1988).  
 
The study by Waddock and Graves (1997) aimed to prove a link between corporate 
social performance and financial performance. They found positive association between 
prior financial performance and corporate social performance. Giving a confirmation to 
the results by McGuire et al. (1988) with different data. Additionally, CSP was also 
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found to have positive linkage with future financial performance. They used return on 
assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and return on sales (ROS) as financial 
performance instruments, which they measured against the CSP rankings of most of the 
S&P 500 companies. The authors conclude that the results acquired from using the 
vastly improved measurement system for corporate social performance support the 
slack resource theory. According to the slack resource theory, firms with good past 
financial performance can better afford investments on responsible strategies (Waddock 
& Graves 1997). This theory was also supported by McGuire et al. (1988). Waddock 
and Graves (1997) additionally implied, that with possibilities to invest in positive 
corporate social performance firms may indirectly gain long-term intangible value in the 
form of better relationships and increased corporate image. This supports the 
stakeholder theory as a viable business strategy. 
 
The time before the 21st century marks 30 years of research in the financial advantages 
of corporate social responsibility. Starting from subjective and handpicked data the 
research developed into using more and more objective data from sources such as the 
Fortune magazine survey and the first CSP ratings from KLD. Along the 21st century 
the KLD database achieved a benchmark role in CSR studies and new research methods 
and datasets for measuring the effects of corporate social responsibility on financial 
performance arose as well. At the beginning of the new century, academics had not been 
able to achieve a consistent answer whether there is a significant linkage between 
corporate social responsibility and financial market indicators. Even though a 
benchmark for measuring corporate social performance had been established via the 
KLD database, other rivaling measurement approaches have begun to appear during the 
new century. Moving towards the beginning of the current decade, multiple different 
databases, indices and performance measures are used in CSR research. 
 
At the beginning of the century McWilliams and Siegel (2001) hypothesize through 
logical thinking that corporate social responsibility should have a neutral effect on firm 
financial performance. Their logic follows the idea that CSR is perceived just like any 
other investment or factor among all the factors that a firm would spend money on. 
Thus an efficient manager would only spend so much on CSR what is required to 
maximize the investment’s profits. To comprehend the idea behind this logic, one could 
think of a situation, where a firm kept hiring more secretaries than needed. Obviously, 
the efficient amount of secretaries would be the number that is needed to sufficiently 
handle the designated secretary duties. The same principle applies for CSR as well, 
according to McWilliams and Siegel (2001). Whether this ideology is a reflection of the 
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research done on the link between financial performance and CSR or whether it is not, 
the hypothesis seems logical.  
 
A different way to determine the effects of corporate social responsibility on market 
factors is used in a study by Becchetti, Ciciretti, Hasan and Kobeissi (2012). They 
examine the market reactions to firms entering and exiting the Domini 400 Social Index 
between 1990 and 2004. By using a simple market model to calculate abnormal returns 
Becchetti et al. (2012) find a significant negative effect on abnormal returns after an exit 
announcement from the Domini index. Abnormal returns are generated returns that 
differ (positively or negatively) from the expected rate of return. It is to be noted, that 
the entering and exiting to or from the Domini 400 are announced the same day the 
event occurs, making it a reliable source for measuring causality. The study also tested 
for control variables such as financial distress and stock market seasonality, even so, the 
results remain persistent. In the light of their results, it seems that the market “punishes” 
firms exiting a social index but doesn’t react on entry events. The authors conclude that 
ethically screened mutual funds forced to sell a stock after a responsibility violation 
might be a reason for the examined penalty after an exit from the index. In another 
words, a violation of ethical criteria leads ethical mutual funds to sell a stock 
independent of its expected financial performance.  
 
Together with Becchetti et al. (2012) also Curran and Moran (2007) investigate the 
impact of index entries and exits on firm market metrics. Instead of the Domini 400 
Social Index Curran and Moran (2007) apply their study on the FTSE4Good Index to 
measure abnormal daily returns. By using a market model, where the abnormal return is 
calculated by subtracting the expected return from the realized return, Curran and 
Moran (2007) find no significant linkage between the entries and exits from the index 
and abnormal returns. The study concludes that firms are not thus penalized or rewarded 
when exiting or entering the index. This result would be convergent with the results by 
Becchetti et al. (2012) if the FTSE4Good index wasn’t a victim of ethical mutual funds 
forced to sell a stock upon the violation of their responsibility criteria. At the end of 
their study, Curran and Moran (2007) additionally note that the long-term reputational 
effects of being in an ethical index were not tested and that they might be significant. In 
other words, companies may gain positive public image by being able to present their 
ethical standings when being listed to the FTSE4Good index. 
 
The study by Humphrey, Lee and Shen (2012) differs from the other studies presented 
since they use an alternate data source for responsibility rankings. While the KLD 
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STATS database has been used predominantly, the Sustainability Asset Management 
Group GmbH (SAM) offers a good alternative for environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) ratings. SAM rates industries with both general and industry-specific 
criteria. For example the Global Reporting Initiative and study by Griffin and Mahon 
(1997) recognize that different industries face different kinds of ESG concerns. The 
KLD STATS treats all industries equally. Humphrey et al. (2012) additionally criticize 
that the KLD ratings are binary; companies are only rated, for example, whether they 
pollute or not, but not in any way by the severity or the level of the pollution emitted. 
SAM, however, uses a scoring system from 0 to 100 for each criterion, which allows for 
differentiation between firms engaging in same ESG activities. 
 
The article by Humphrey, Lee and Shen (2012) asks whether corporate social 
performance, which is increasingly pressured on businesses, can increase firm value or 
is it a waste of resources. The study examines the impacts of corporate social 
performance on cost of capital and risk. Specifically, they use total returns, standard 
deviations to measure total risk, risk and reward ratios measured by total return divided 
by standard deviation and Sharpe ratios for risk-adjusted performance. Sharpe ratio is 
defined as the total return minus the risk-free rate divided by standard deviation 
(Humphrey et al. 2012). Additionally the authors use two different market models, first 
to determine a one-factor alpha for each portfolio and second to control for size, book-
to-market and momentum risk factors. The latter model is also known as the Four- 
Factor Carhart (1997) model. The study by Humphrey et al. (2012) finds no difference 
in risk-adjusted performance of the sample companies between firms with high and low 
CSP ratings. Exceptionally, the sample population was gathered from firms in the U.K. 
As a conclusion the empirical evidence indicated that firms do not suffer or gain any 
significant costs or benefits by implementing CSP. It is to be noted that since the study 
by Humphrey et al. (2012) applies CSR ratings previously unused in the articles 
mentioned in this thesis with a sample collected from U.K. firms, their results don’t 
necessarily receive much congruence with the results from other studies. However, if 
future research confirms SAM as a competent source of CSR data, it may be used to 
apply reliability checks for the studies conducted with the KLD STATS. 
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4. CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING  
 
Corporate responsible disclosures have been found from corporate annual reports 
already in the beginning of the 1900’s but the topic reached wider academic interest 
during the 1960’s and 1970’s. Especially the economic despair during the 70’s made 
researchers ask the question: does economic welfare and orientation to profit 
maximization reflect the ultimate social benefits that corporations contribute to society? 
Ever since academic research has focused on explaining the different phenomena found 
in the field of corporate social responsibility, what it means for corporations and how it 
is communicated to stakeholders. This chapter focuses on explaining the main theories 
often discussed in the field of corporate social disclosure. Furthermore the chapter gives 
a deeper insight into the Global Reporting Initiative. (Guthrie & Parker 1989; 
Ramanathan 1976) 
 
 
4.1. Theory and terminology of responsibility reporting 
 
While chapter five focuses on the financial literature explaining such topics as voluntary 
disclosure from financial perspective some theories shall be opened in the area of social 
reporting. These theories and terminology fulfill the role of explaining and categorizing 
different phenomena repeatedly met on the field of corporate ethics and responsible 
standards. Academia has mostly concentrated on examining and hypothesizing the 
corporate motive behind social disclosures as such information release has for the most 
part been voluntary. By understanding the theoretical and terminological aspect one can 
come into comprehension of the mechanisms behind responsible reporting and social 
standards both from the corporate and from the stakeholder perspective.  
 
4.1.1. Social accounting 
 
For a long period it was the belief that the corporate purpose is to maximize profits and 
by abiding to this belief corporations were contributing to the society. However, a new 
way of defining corporate responsibility arose during the 1960’s that was in contrast 
with the earlier beliefs.  The big oil depression in the 1970’s along with arising concerns 
in environmental issues attributed to the criticism that perhaps generating profits was 
not an all-inclusive criterion for corporate social performance. Social disclosures began 
to appear in the business world and academia more notably in the 1970’s when 
corporations began to recognize the informational value of their social and 
environmental impacts (Abbott & Monsen 1979). Responsible deeds and social 
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reporting became the status quo and for example in 1973 altogether 298 Fortune 500 
companies had disclosed some sort of social performance information on their annual 
reports. Along with this new line of reporting became the need to define it. The term 
social accounting was introduced as the practice for reporting on corporate social 
performance and to differentiate from financial accounting. Corporate social reporting 
or social accounting is the means for corporations to disclose information concerning 
firm’s actions that affect its implicit and explicit stakeholders, the environmental impact 
of its actions and contributions of its products or services (Anderson & Frankle 1980). 
(Ramanathan 1976.) 
 
Ramanathan (1976) took a practical approach towards developing a systematic 
information system for corporate social performance. Looking back at the steps taken in 
the development of financial accounting systems Ramanthan defined that the theory and 
practice of financial accounting has evolved through a set of themes and predicted 
similar development path for social accounting. According to Ramanathan (1976) the 
themes that accounting practices have evolved around include framework objectives, 
valuation concepts, measurement methodology and reporting standards. From the 
perspective of theoretical framework Ramanathan (1976) defines social accounting as 
“the process of selecting firm-level social performance variables, measures and 
measurement procedures; systematically developing information useful for evaluating 
the firm’s social performance; and communicating such information to concerned 
social groups, both within and outside the firm.” The definition essentially recognizes 
that not all businesses can be measured with the same metrics to produce 
comprehensive information on corporate social performance. Furthermore, the 
definition insists social measurement procedures to become an integrated part of 
corporate processes. Lastly it references to the importance of consistent internal and 
external communication of social performance across businesses. That is, consistent 
data collection and reporting practices are essential in ensuring the comparability of 
corporate social disclosures across all unique corporate entities. These inferences are 
also echoed from set of objectives Ramanathan (1976) defines as integral to the 
theoretical framework of social accounting. Even though corporate social reporting was 
in its infancy during 1970’s Ramanathan’s (1976) definition is still relevant today.  
 
At the beginning of social accounting the first step was to acknowledge that there is a 
collective pressure from stakeholders and the public to get information on business 
activities and their effects on the social community and the environment. Social 
accounting arose as the practice for answering these needs. To successfully report on 
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social contributions new methods needed to be developed since responsible information 
is often found in qualitative form or requires advanced measuring to obtain quantitative 
data. However, at the beginning of social accounting businesses mostly concentrated on 
investigating those aspects of their business that could be reported on, since at the time 
they lacked proper methods to measure the relevant quantitative data and to execute 
social audits. Social audits can be seen as one way of collecting data on the social and 
environmental impacts of businesses but at the beginning of social accounting this 
method lacked credibility. Reputational surveys can be considered another way of 
collecting the public’s opinion on such impacts. Some earlier studies introduced in 
chapter three such as Vance (1975) and Aupperle et al. (1985) used surveys in 
collecting their data. However, reputational surveys are subject to the respondents’ 
image of the firm, which ultimately leads the surveys to be biased. This is because such 
image-based perceptions are influenced by company size, age and visibility in the mass 
media. Another limitation of reputational surveys is the quantity of data the respondents 
are able to produce. For example, assessing multiple reputational factors of an index 
constructed of hundreds of companies is an overpowering task for any individual. Next 
to social audits and reputational surveys, social accounting has also applied content 
analysis in order to collect information. Content analysis is the method of establishing 
the informational value by codifying the content devoted to, for example, social 
responsibility of any written document, such as annual reports, press releases or other 
company disclosures intended for communication purposes. For example, content 
analysis could be applied to examine how much space or pages in an annual report is 
used for reporting corporate social responsibility. (Abbott & Monsen 1979.) 
 
4.1.2. Sociopolitical theories 
 
Social and political theories have had a central role in the specification of corporate 
motives behind social disclosure. Sociopolitical theories are based on the notion that the 
financial aspect is only one element in business organizations and that it cannot be 
studied in sole isolation from political and social elements. The sociopolitical theories 
within voluntary disclosure are ultimately intertwined and many similarities can be 
found across the field. However, two theories arise in this category above others in 
terms of amount of research, support and contestation; these are the legitimacy theory 
and the stakeholder theory. Whereas these theories aim to explain the motives for 
disclosure, greenwashing can be considered as an unfortunate phenomenon attempting 
to exploit corporate disclosures to further strategies with obscure ethics (Gray, Kouhy & 
Lavers 1995; Laufer 2003). 
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The legitimacy theory has been a popular title in research trying to explain corporate 
motives behind voluntary social disclosures. Legitimacy theory has to do with 
corporations seeking to enhance their reputation, legitimize their actions and be 
considered as good corporate citizens. The theory proposes that positive corporate 
responsible disclosures may be used to communicate the corporate efforts in social and 
environmental areas. The purpose of such communication is to receive societal 
acceptance and legitimize corporate operations with the ultimate goal of justifying its 
continued existence within the society. (Guthrie & Parker 1989, Bebbington, Larrinaga 
& Moneva 2008.) 
 
Four strategies have been defined within legitimacy theory that corporations may take 
in order to upkeep, define or regain their role as a legitimized corporate citizens 
applicable in different circumstances (Bebbington et al. 2008). The first strategy 
involves utilizing corporate social disclosures as vessels in communicating new 
information of those actions that the firm has taken in response to societal and 
stakeholder expectations. For example, the first strategy might be used in situations 
where the status quo of what is expected from corporations from the social and 
environmental field has changed and the firm knowingly takes actions towards 
complying with the new public expectations. In the second strategy corporations may 
use lobbying, education and informing to influence the public’s opinion of those goals 
or methods the company uses in its corporate strategy. That is, the second method is not 
about changing corporate practices but convincing the community of the 
appropriateness of them. The third strategy is an extension to the second in that it 
doesn’t involve a change in corporate practices but nor does it involve the effort of 
attempting to change the public opinions. Rather in the third strategy the organization 
merely focuses on being publicly associated with such methods, achievements or goals 
that are popularly perceived as appropriate. For example, the organization might ignore 
its environmental polluting and draw attention from this by emphasizing its involvement 
in charitable causes (Gray et al. 1995). The fourth strategy is based on the corporation 
affecting the popular perception of what ultimately is accepted as the goals and methods 
of organizations. That is the firm attempts to change the status quo of what is 
collectively considered acceptable via education and information and therefore does not 
involve a change in the corporate practices but rather in societal expectations. 
(Bebbington et al. 2008.)   
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The stakeholder theory in corporate social reporting resonates from the stakeholder 
theory introduced earlier in this thesis. Freeman (1984: 25) conducts that a stakeholder 
is ”any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the 
firm’s objectives.” In the core of stakeholder theory is stakeholder management so that 
corporate strategy can be put into effect without suffering from interruptions from 
stakeholders with the ability to influence the performance of the firm. Therefore, 
stakeholder theory suggests that stakeholder needs must be considered when planning 
corporate strategy. This aims to secure the firm from possibly harmful actions of the 
most influential stakeholders. For example, some stakeholder groups may be crucial for 
the business in acquiring corporate resources or whose support is required for the 
corporation to continue to exist. In order to achieve the strategic objectives the firm 
must assess stakeholder demands and attempt to optimize corporate resources to best 
match these demands. Social reporting has been seen to offer an appropriate channel for 
corporate management to inform of these actions taken in consideration of important 
stakeholders. (Ullmann 1985, Roberts 1992.) 
 
 Ullmann (1985) and Roberts (1992) can be considered in the core of developing 
stakeholder theory into its current form (Gray et al. 1995). Ullmann (1985) developed a 
three-dimensional model in explaining stakeholder theory against corporate social and 
financial performance as well as social disclosure. The first dimension states that the 
more influential the stakeholder is, for example in corporate resource management, the 
more inclined the corporate management is in adjusting business strategy to align with 
stakeholder demands. Roberts (1992) shows support for the first dimension with 
evidence that corporate disclosures can have a positive effect in stockholder, creditor 
and political management. The second dimension hypothesizes that businesses with 
more active stakeholder relationship are also more active in corporate responsibility as 
with more active stakeholder management also comes better understanding of 
stakeholder needs. The third dimension concerns the relation between financial 
performance and corporate responsibility. It states that better economic performance 
enhances corporate capabilities in launching responsible programs. Ullmann (1985) 
therefore suggests that better financial performance may indicate better corporate 
responsibility. Such hypothesis is also known as the slack resource theory, which is 
taken into consideration in the empirical part of this this thesis, (Waddock & Graves 
1997). 
 
Corporate motives for voluntary disclosures have received their share of criticism. For 
example, some research supporting the legitimacy theory have suggested that voluntary 
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social disclosures may be used more as tools in corporate reputational management than 
as constructive disclosure of actual social and environmental impacts (Laufer 2003). An 
issue among the responsible reporting field that reaches beyond reputational exploit of 
voluntary disclosures is greenwashing. Greenwashing is described as a deceptive 
presentation of firm objectives, commitments and accomplishments (Laufer 2003). 
Laufer (2003) categorizes confusion, fronting and posturing to be the three different 
elements of deceptive greenwashing aimed for creating an appearance of ethicality 
when the truth is in fact reverse. Confusion greenwashing relies on the complexity of 
corporations and decentralized decision-making where information is lost or controlled 
within documentation. Internally, fronting may take the form of several ethics and 
responsible committees where the objectives can seem relevant. Whereas fronting in the 
external environment may arise as corporate scapegoating. With posturing corporate 
decisions, programs, projects and culture are promoted as ethical or responsibly aware 
when the final outcome might be something else. In light of such deceptive practices 
among corporations the voluntary nature of responsible disclosures have been 
questioned. The Global Reporting Initiative has relieved such distress by offering 
standardized measures and guidelines for responsible reporting but has not managed to 
lift all concerns due to not enforcing third party verification for corporate disclosures 
released under the initiative. (Laufer 2003.) 
 
 
4.2. The European Union’s directive for non-financial information 
 
Until recently corporate social reporting has been widely regarded as a voluntary 
practice and vast amount of research has been committed to investigating the motives 
behind such voluntarism. However, in late 2014 the European Union passed a new 
directive, the 2014/95/EU on disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by 
certain large undertakings and groups, which has become the starting point for turning 
the previously voluntary practice into regulated organizational duty. The directive 
amends the accounting directive 2013/34/EU, which was passed 26th of June in 2013. 
The accounting directive’s main elements are the European Union’s policies for 
corporate annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related 
reports. The Directive 2014/95/EU complements the accounting directive with more 
advanced policies on non-financial disclosure in the European Union.  
 
The directive 2014/95/EU promotes the disclosure of non-financial information as a tool 
for measuring, monitoring and managing sustainable risks, increasing trust within 
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investors and stakeholders as well as accounting for the impact businesses have on 
society and the environment. However, the European Union is still far from having 
developed one universally applicable guideline for responsible reporting. In fact, one of 
the goals for the new directive is to offer great flexibility and take into account the 
dynamic nature of CSR. Therefore, the new directive was constructed so that it would 
allow the diverse responsibility policies already implemented by businesses but also to 
guarantee sufficient comparability among entities. The directive sets the financial year 
2017 to be the first year of which the concerned organizations are required to report, 
thus resulting for the first reports to be published in 2018. (2014/95/EU 2014.) 
 
The directive 2014/95/EU requires the disclosure of at least environmental matters, 
social and employee-related matters, respect for human rights and anti-bribery and 
corruption matters. The disclosure should extend to include a description of relevant 
risks, implemented policies and possible or proven outcomes for all of the required 
matters. The organizations that fall under the new directive are set to be “-- those large 
undertakings which are public-interest entities and to those public-interest entities 
which are parent undertakings of a large group, in each case having an average 
number of employees in excess of 500, in the case of a group on a consolidated basis.” 
Thus, SME’s are preliminarily relieved from the increased burden of regulatory 
reporting. Conclusively the new directive aims to increase the relevance, consistency 
and comparability between large organizations within the Union. At the same time the 
directive will bring extinction to the sheer voluntarism social disclosure has been 
previously based on. Therefore the current state offers an excellent ground for 
investigating how responsible reporting has developed before going under regulation. 
(2014/95/EU 2014.) 
 
 
4.3. The Global reporting initiative  
 
The Global reporting initiative is a sustainability reporting framework launched in 2000. 
Its aim is to increase organizational transparency and help in the understanding and 
communication of sustainable matters both inside and outside organizations. The 
framework relies on a multi-stakeholder approach, which enables diverse possibilities to 
develop the model. Since its inception in 2000 the GRI guideline has become the global 
benchmark for sustainable reporting (Vigneau & Humphreys 2014). Even as a voluntary 
guideline the GRI framework has become a standard report throughout industries and 
now over 93% of world’s 250 largest corporations report on their responsible 
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performance (GRI b, 2015). However, with popularity also comes criticism. Several 
academic authors have taken an interest towards the GRI and several studies research 
the effects the guideline is having on organizations and their corporate responsibility.  
 
4.3.1. A global reporting standard 
 
GRI is a global independent organization whose main task is to develop and maintain 
the Global reporting initiative: a comprehensive reporting guideline for sustainability 
reporting. GRI collaborates with the United Nations, which has also given the GRI 
reporting guidelines their endorsement as the leading standard in creating globally 
applicable guidelines for reporting corporate economic, environmental and social 
performance (GRI 2015 b, UN 2015). GRI was established in 1997 in the United States. 
Three organizations were mainly involved in the establishment, namely an US non-
profit organization: the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies 
(CERES), the Tellus Insitute, a non-profit research and policy organization and the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). A preliminary version of 
sustainability reporting guidelines directed for global use was drafted already in the 
early 1990s within CERES by Dr. Robert Massie and Dr. Allen White. After the 
establishment of GRI this preliminary version was developed into the first Global 
Reporting Initiative guidelines, which were launched in 2000. (GRI a, 2015.) 
 
In 2002 the second generation of GRI guidelines, the G2, was launched. In the same 
year the organization was officially inaugurated as a collaborating unit with UNEP. The 
early 2000’s were focused on developing the organizational governance of GRI 
including the establishment of several new organs aimed to develop and support the 
organization in all aspects. For example, the Organizational Stakeholders Program 
helped to develop the governance mechanism and secure funding from financial 
contributors. The GRI Stakeholder Council was appointed to cover stakeholder interest 
and to assist the Board. Also a Technical Advisory Committee was established in order 
to develop the quality and coherence of the GRI framework. During the latter part of the 
decade GRI concentrated on obtaining a foothold as an established organization. The 
steps included the launch of G3, the organization’s third reporting standard. The G3 
encouraged multiple businesses to take on the sustainability reporting practice and thus 
increased global awareness of the standard. (GRI a, 2015.)  
 
With the new decade, the 2010’s, GRI continued to expand and gain credibility. Several 
collaborations with other organizations also contributing to social responsibility have 
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vastly increased the applicability of the reporting initiative. With the UN Global 
Compact, most well known for its 10 principles for corporate sustainability (UNGC 
2015), GRI signed a letter for mutual understanding including the integration of the 10 
principles into the reporting standard. Also guidelines for applying GRI in collaboration 
with the ISO 26000, a set of recommendations for organizations to act responsibly, as 
well as with the Carbon Disclosure Project, an organization promoting the measurement 
and disclosure of corporate environmental performance (CDP 2015), were launched. 
(GRI a, 2015.) 
 
In the recent years the most significant step for GRI has been the launch of its fourth 
reporting guideline, the G4. This generation of guidelines offers reporting principles, 
standard disclosures and a manual for implementation that is applicable by 
organizations of any size or sector. Also, the passing of the new directive in the 
European Union, mandating corporate social reporting for certain large undertakings 
guaranteed the future demand for developing a globally applicable and meaningful 
reporting standard for sustainability. Most notably, the directive itself recommends the 
usage of already existing well-recognized reporting frameworks including the Global 
Reporting Initiative (2014/95/EU 2014). Whilst the directive also lists other frameworks 
applicable such as the UN Global Compact and the ISO 26000, GRI would seem to 
have advantageous position to emerge as the preferred choice for reporting framework. 
This is due to the efforts made in earlier years to ensure the standard’s compatibility 
with the other existing systems and guidelines concerning corporate and organizational 
responsibility. (GRI a, 2015.)  
 
 
4.3.2. Research in the Global reporting initiative 
 
Naturally, the Global reporting initiative has awakened an interest in academic research 
since its inception. Academics have investigated the positive and negative aspects of the 
reporting standard as well as the aspects that come with complying the standard, both 
internally and externally to the reporting organization. It is clear that the Global 
reporting initiative has not managed to avoid all criticism. However, GRI’s multi-
stakeholder approach, that is the framework is constantly developed in collaboration 
with different stakeholder groups, such as NGOs and businesses, may help the 
framework to turn constructive criticism into practical solutions (Vigneau & 
Humphreys 2014). Such development though is not yet present in the most recent 
research.  
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After the launch of the first GRI guidelines in 2000 Hedberg and Malmborg (2003) 
were among the first to examine the corporate motives behind choosing to report 
according to the GRI and how adopting the new standard has affected corporate social 
responsibility and environmental management in the firms under investigation. Hedbeg 
and Malmborg (2003) examined a sample of ten companies based in Sweden in 2001 
and completed their empirical research mostly through qualitative research methods. 
Their study gives a comprehensive look at how companies began to utilize the new 
reporting guideline, what were their motives to choose the GRI and what kinds of 
effects they saw in their organizations after taking on the GRI. Hedberg and Malmborg 
(2003) found that there were various practices for utilizing the GRI in sustainability 
reports, which is made possible by the flexibility of the guideline. Some companies 
merely used GRI as inspiration for responsible reporting whereas others followed the 
guideline more closely. When it came to the motives for choosing to apply the GRI 
companies reported that they found the standard to be a widely accepted framework or 
that they believed the standard to soon become more widely recognized and thus 
utilizing the GRI would lend credibility to their sustainable reporting (Hedberg & 
Malmborg 2003). Moreover, all of the companies studied were eager to develop their 
responsible reporting and some found that the GRI guideline provided a good structure 
to follow as well as insight to the indicators relevant for sustainable reporting. Most 
notable message that came from the effect of utilizing the guideline was an 
improvement in internal communications, improved data collection and firm’s increased 
apprehension of itself. Hedberg and Malmborg (2003) conclude that utilizing the GRI 
standard in addition to external communication, therefore offers also internal benefits. 
In the end they however criticize that GRI does not require verification of the reports 
made using its guideline, which is imminent to cause misconception. GRI has 
recognized the problem but at the time referred that the guideline is only a 
recommendation for what sustainability reporting can withhold, not a regulated 
directive (Hedberg & Malmborg 2003). This ultimately transfers to great variability in 
the sustainable reports in the early 2000’s. 
 
Willis (2003) succeeds in communicating some of the characteristics of the GRI 
framework whilst researching the possibilities the new reporting guideline offers for the 
social screening of investments. Four points are emphasized that describe the main 
qualities of the GRI guideline: first, it is noted that the GRI guideline is intended to be a 
voluntary framework. Secondly, the framework is directed for all types of companies 
but GRI does offer some more practical instructions for sectors with special 
characteristics such as financial services. Thirdly, reporting by the GRI guidelines 
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cannot be considered a performance standard but rather a tool for understanding 
business performance from the social and environmental aspect. Lastly, GRI has 
recognized that the demand for sustainability report verification will likely increase but 
currently have decided not to offer such service due to lack in resources as well as 
wanting to offer businesses time to gain more experience in their reporting framework 
(Willis 2003). Toppinen and Korhonen-Kurki (2013) validate some of these 
characteristics in their paper focusing on sustainability reporting of companies operating 
in the forest industry between 2005 and 2009. They motivate choosing this industry 
since it is heavily driven by natural resources and thus its business is directly linked to 
environmental responsibility. They find that reporting and social disclosures have 
increased as well as improved during the examined time frame. However, their research 
gives way to criticism towards GRI as well. While being a flexible framework for 
sustainability reporting, this characteristic also reduces the comparability between 
organizations. Since the framework does not verify GRI reports nor judge the 
effectiveness of corporate responsible performance the variability among corporations’ 
reporting practices is big. When it comes to the forest industry the study cannot prove 
that adopting the GRI would have increased reporting transparency either. They 
conclude that GRI is mostly used in managing corporate sustainability efforts and 
protecting or promoting corporate reputation as well as enhancing sustainable brand 
values (Toppinen & Korhonen-Kurki 2013). 
  
The study by Vigneau and Humphreys (2014) continues with similar research to 
Hedberg and Malmborg (2003), only over a decade later. At this point in time GRI had 
launched its fourth generation of reporting guidelines and had an established role as the 
most recognized and globally applicable sustainable reporting standard (Hahn & Lülfs 
2014). Nowadays a multinational corporation (MNC) is most likely to differentiate from 
competitors and attract stakeholder pressure if it is not disclosing information on 
corporate responsibility (Vigneau & Humphreys 2014). Vigneau and Humphreys (2014) 
examine how the intended application of the GRI framework differs from the actual end 
result and how this consequently affects organizational practices in MNCs. The study 
finds that adopting the GRI framework for sustainability reporting has a causal effect on 
both reporting practices as well as on corporate management. As the GRI becomes an 
established part of business reporting it is at the same time becoming institutionalized 
within the business routine, ultimately transforming into another mandatory norm the 
firm must comply to secure legitimacy and to assess its responsible performance. Such 
ideology was studied to influence the process of collecting CSR information and to 
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increase responsible disclosure instead of increasing the responsible performance of the 
business (Vigneau & Humphreys 2014).  
 
GRI’s institutionalization within the business can also shift the organizational practices 
around social responsibility. Vingeau and Humphreys (2014) found that constructing 
the GRI report molded CSR practices to better match the key performance indicators 
(KPIs) defined under the framework therefore affecting the selection of responsible 
activities launched in organizations. Also, reporters could become blind to responsible 
processes that were not designated a specific KPI in the GRI guidelines. Such behavior 
entails that if a responsible activity within the firm cannot straightforwardly be reported 
by following the GRI guidelines, it may not be reported at all or discontinued even if the 
activity is an important part of business strategy (Vigneau & Humphreys 2014). 
Conclusively, the GRI framework is on its way of changing the corporate perception of 
what is social responsibility and sustainability; complying by a sustainability reporting 
guideline is being regarded as CSR whereas the importance of increasing actual 
responsible performance is being forgotten. Probably the most critical perspective on 
GRI is by Milne & Gray (2013) who continue with the ideology that reporting 
guidelines are making businesses more focused on reporting than on responsible 
performance. Taking a step further on this discussion their paper concerns the 
disconnection between corporate practice on sustainability reporting and the issue of 
sustaining the ecological systems on which the society, the environment and other 
species depend on. Milne and Gray (2013) especially criticize GRI’s role in 
strengthening the consensus that reporting on the economic, environmental and social 
aspects of business is becoming interchangeable to corporate sustainability.  
 
Due to the pressing literature reviewed here criticizing GRI reports becoming a “taken-
for-granted” -type of organizational norm this thesis only concentrates on the 
publications of firms that disclose a GRI report for the first time. This method is seen to 
minimize the possible institutionalization effect of GRI and the evidenced causality on 
CSR measurements and activities.  
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5. FINANCIAL LITERATURE 
 
This chapter focuses on reviewing the main financial literature relevant to this study. 
The topics in review include voluntary disclosure, information asymmetry and liquidity. 
The idea is to give a deeper look at the definitions of these topics and the most relevant 
studies in these areas in respect to the topic of this thesis. The literature on voluntary 
disclosure aims to reveal the main motives and economical consequences behind the 
public disclosure of information. Information asymmetry is in the core of voluntary 
disclosure and how its effects on businesses and market trading are determined. It is 
important to recognize that even though often proxied by liquidity, information 
asymmetry and liquidity are not interchangeable. Therefore, the main concepts and 
qualities that have been developed around liquidity are briefly discussed.  
 
 
5.1. Voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry 
 
Disclosing financial information is mandatory and regulated by law and businesses are 
expected to disclose their financial performance on a regular basis to stakeholders. 
However, most firms also choose to disclose information voluntarily in addition to what 
is required legally. The financial literature has taken an interest in examining and 
explaining the motives behind voluntary disclosure as well as the possible effects it has 
on the business, the market and investors. These effects are often described via changes 
in corporate information asymmetry. As the two themes are closely intertwined in 
academic literature it seems only appropriate to introduce them together. 
 
Information asymmetry describes the informational imbalance between the firm and 
market traders but it can also refer to the imbalance between different traders. The 
informational imbalance most often concerns knowledge about the expected future 
returns of the firm’s securities. Therefore, such information asymmetry between the 
firm and different investors makes some participants more informed than others. In such 
situations the market may be filled with speculation since the traders without 
information suspect to be less informed. In high information asymmetry security prices 
may include a premium with which less informed traders price protect themselves 
against the unknown risks held by more informed traders. (Diamond 1985; Glosten & 
Milgrom 1985; Diamond & Verrecchia 1991; Leuz & Verrecchia 2000.) 
 
Diamond (1985) proposes a general equilibrium model with endogenous information 
collection as to mechanism where voluntary disclosure policies bring welfare upon 
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shareholders more than a policy of no disclosure. The proposition is built over a model 
where traders are able to acquire inside information but at a cost. In the case of public 
disclosure by the firm traders would be less inclined to acquire costly information since 
voluntarily disclosed information is more economical for traders as well as having an 
effect of reducing speculation on the market. The proposition is rationalized through the 
costs of acquiring and producing information. Diamond (1985) explains that the cost for 
each investor to acquire a unique piece of information about the expected returns of the 
firm highly exceeds the costs that the firm faces in producing a piece of information 
directed for all investors. The incentive for the firm to voluntarily disclose is to 
homogenize information and to reduce speculation upon its securities. That is, reducing 
speculation reduces the information asymmetries between market participants. High 
market speculation of a company’s stock may cause shareholders to sell as well as to 
increase the illiquidity of the stock via the before-mentioned protective premiums. An 
illiquid stock is disadvantageous to the firm since it needs to discount the price of its 
shares to find willing investors to hold the stock. Discounting the share price 
consequentially increases firm’s cost of capital, which is undesirable (Leuz & 
Verrecchia 2000). The paper by Diamond (1985) is among the first to establish a 
positive link between voluntary disclosures and shareholder wealth, which ultimately is 
the purpose behind firm endeavors (Friedman 1970). 
 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) continue to examine the effects of public disclosures 
and relate the subject to lowered information asymmetry and consequentially to lower 
cost of capital. Their paper is related to the earlier works in the field, such as Kyle 
(1985), Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Diamond (1985) in examining information 
asymmetry and the role of private and public information on the market. However, 
opposed to previous research Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) develop the ideas by 
modeling an illiquid market where market makers are risk averse and have limited risk-
bearing capacity. Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) show that in such model public 
disclosures increase stock liquidity, which attracts large institutional investors to take 
large positions in the security. Due to the increased liquidity of the security the expected 
rate of return is lower since the security is less risky to the holder; that is its cost of 
capital is reduced. In this setting the firm gains benefits from the lower cost of capital 
and large traders benefit from securities with higher liquidity making them more 
responsive to liquidity shocks. Therefore, Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) show that 
both the firm as well as stockholders can benefit from the effects of public disclosures. 
The paper finds that these effects are more significant for larger firms. While Diamond 
and Verrecchia (1991) take a theoretical approach Botosan (1997) provides empirical 
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robustness to the benefits of voluntary disclosure. She manages to show that the cost of 
equity capital is negatively associated with firm size and positively to a security’s beta 
when firm voluntarily discloses information on an annual report. Botosan (1997) 
however constructs her own disclosure index and the results hold only for firms with 
low analyst following. Additionally, the paper is constructed merely on one year of data 
and alone for the manufacturing industry. Thus the results cannot be guaranteed of 
universal validity.  
 
More recently Balakirshnan, Billings, Kelly and Ljungqvist (2014) show in an empirical 
setting that managers can manipulate their share liquidity and plausibly firm value with 
voluntary disclosures. The paper finds that disclosures can causally have a positive 
effect on share liquidity, which in turn can increase firm value. They further suggest 
that voluntary disclosures are mainly aimed for smaller investors usually considered to 
be in informational disadvantage compared to institutional investors. The study by 
Balakirshnan et al. (2014) motivates the voluntary disclosure of information by 
corporations and encourages studying the area of voluntary disclosures further.  
 
Many studies on voluntary disclosure evolve around a setting where a firm chooses to 
disclose information. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) hypothesize a new setting, which 
differentiates a choice and a commitment to disclose more. The paper begins with 
explaining the already familiar theory that increased disclosure by firms reduces 
information asymmetry but that such effects have been difficult to measure empirically. 
In addition to inconsistencies in measurement practices, for example directly measuring 
cost of capital, they argue that many studies set in the U.S. face the fact that the 
reporting environment is already mature and rich in content. Therefore, a rise in 
voluntary disclosures might not be able to give substantially more informational value 
than what the current U.S. reporting standards already require. Leuz and Verrecchia 
(2000) choose to conduct an empirical test in a German setting since the German 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (German GAAP) have been criticized for 
low levels of disclosure. The paper studies firms making a switch from the German 
GAAP to a more informative disclosure standard such as the International Accounting 
Standard (IAS) or the U.S. GAAP. This change is seen as a substantial increase in 
disclosure and thus Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) believe this setting to be a valid 
strategy to measure the impacts of permanently increased levels of disclosure; that is a 
commitment to increased disclosure. Indeed the paper shows that firms committing to 
either of the new standards lower their information asymmetry proxied both by the bid-
ask spread as well as the turnover rate, a measure also used in this thesis. The paper by 
48 
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) also offers more than just robustness to the liquidity 
measure used here. The main component of their hypothesis: differentiating a choice 
and a commitment to disclose is readily applicable to the setting of this thesis as well. 
Conducting a GRI report can be considered a choice but which more or less necessitates 
a future commitment to the standard. This fact motivates the choice of only including 
first time publishers of the GRI in the empirics of the thesis ultimately examining the 
effects of a new commitment to a widely accepted responsible reporting standard.  
 
A similar study to Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) is also conducted by Petersen and 
Plenborg (2006). They grasp onto the ideology of previous literature and hypothesize 
that increased voluntary disclosure lowers the information asymmetry component of 
firm’s cost of capital and test this in the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. The motivation 
to conduct the study in a Danish setting is the institutional differences between 
Denmark and U.S. as well as an attempt to establish whether the theory of voluntary 
disclosure applies in a non-U.S. setting. The ownership structure in Danish companies is 
more concentrated and family-centered compared to data that has been used previously 
therefore serving as a new structural environment to test the theory. High ownership 
concentration and family ownership may reduce the enthusiasm to voluntary disclose as 
inside information can be more readily obtainable. Petersen and Plenborg (2006) use the 
bid-ask spread as well as the turnover rate as their proxies for information asymmetry 
and end up constructing a disclosure index suitable for the Danish setting. The results 
complement the conclusions of earlier studies that increased voluntary disclosure lowers 
information asymmetries and their results are robust to the different firm characteristics 
present in Denmark. Furthermore, Petersen and Plenborg (2006) hope that future studies 
would examine the differences in effects from voluntary financial and non-financial 
disclosures.  
 
 
5.2. Liquidity 
 
Liquidity is elusive in its definitions and measurements, therefore the theoretical 
literature around liquidity consist of more than one approach. Black (1971) describes 
four attributes of a liquid market: (1) for investors that wish to buy or sell small 
amounts of stock immediately bid and ask prices are always available. (2) The spread, 
that is the difference between the bid and ask prices, is always small. (3) In the case of 
buying or selling a large amount of stock, the investor can expect to do the exchange 
over a long period of time with a price close to the current market price when there is no 
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special information. (4) A large amount of stock can be bought or sold immediately 
with a premium or discount depending on the size of the exchange. These themes are 
more or less found in other literature describing the different phenomena around 
liquidity and give a good preliminary overlook to the topic.  
 
The liquidity effects of block trades, that is trades involving large amounts of stock, are 
studied by Kraus and Stoll (1972). They hypothesize a distribution effect, which can 
appear when investors have differing preferences or due to short run liquidity costs. In 
the first case, if the expectations of the buyer differ from those of the seller and trading 
can affect the price of the security. For example, a trader willing to sell a large quantity 
of stock may have to reduce the asking price (to increase the expected rate of return) to 
level with the expectations of a buyer willing to hold such block. Therefore, block 
trades can have an effect on the equilibrium price of a security. In the second case of the 
distribution effect the buyer or seller may have to provide a commission to a dealer if 
the trader has difficulties finding willing buyers or sellers in the short run. Here the 
dealer will pay a price lower than the equilibrium in the case of a sell. The expected rate 
of return is altered only for a short while and the price is expected to return to 
equilibrium shortly. Kraus and Stoll (1972) find evidence towards the distribution effect 
and conclude that pressure from institutional traders is a significant factor in the price 
effect of block trades.  
 
Kyle (1985) connects inside information and liquidity. His study examines the price 
impacts of trades when the market consists of three types of traders: an insider with 
access to private information, uninformed noise traders who trade randomly and market 
makers with the agenda of setting efficient prices conditional on the aggregated quantity 
of trades. In such setting, the informed trader is able to make profits as the noise traders’ 
exchanges offer camouflage so that the market maker cannot distinguish the different 
traders from the order flow. The important inference from this is that in semi-strong 
market efficiency private information can be used to increase profits. However, with 
strong market speculation private information may widen the spread as uninformed 
investors suspect the presence of insiders and thus demand a premium for their trades 
(Glosten & Milgrom 1985). 
 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) take similar approach to Kyle (1985). They hypothesize a 
situation where the market maker’s profit is set to zero. If there are traders with private 
information the market maker faces an adverse selection problem. Adverse selection 
problem is a situation where decisions are made with potentially undesired results due 
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to information asymmetry among different parties. Hence, the market maker is 
vulnerable to losses when trading against informed investors. The market maker makes 
up for the losses by setting the bid and ask prices so that profits are gained by trading 
with non-informed liquidity traders. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) conclude that the 
width of the spread is dependent on multiple factors: the trading patterns induced by 
insiders and liquidity traders, the depth of supply and demand among liquidity traders as 
well as the level of information obtained by the insiders. They also confirm that the 
adverse selection problem can bring forth a wider spread between the bid and ask prices 
of a security.   
 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) study the relation of illiquidity and asset pricing where 
illiquidity is measured by the cost of an immediate trade which is reflected from the 
spread between bid and ask prices. They hypothesize that expected asset returns are an 
increasing and concave function of the bid-ask spread in the sense that higher spread 
assets yield higher expected returns. Their model additionally predicts that a longer 
holding period subjects for higher expected returns. They use 19 years of financial data 
and model both OLS (ordinary least squares) and GLS (generalized least squares) 
regressions where GLS is called for to unbias the estimated variances of the regression 
coefficients. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) find that the risk-adjusted excess returns 
increase with the widening of the bid-ask spread. Their results also support that asset 
return-spread relation is increasing and concave as their model shows positive and 
generally decreasing slope coefficients of the spreads. In the light of their results 
Amihud and Mendelson suggest that the increasing and concave return-spread 
relationship should encourage firms to increase their share liquidity in order to reduce 
their opportunity cost of capital. Also, they encourage further studies to examine 
whether, for example, information disclosures may be utilized as investments in 
increased liquidity.  
 
The bid-ask spread has been a widely used measure in liquidity related research. Apart 
from that also the daily ratio of absolute stock return to its dollar volume (Amihud 
2002) as well as the turnover rate, which is employed for example by Datar, Naik and 
Radcliffe (1998) have been used as measures for liquidity. Datar et al. (1998) provide 
robustness to Amihud and Mendelson’s (1986) paper by examining liquidity and cross-
sectional variation in stock returns via the turnover rate. They define turnover rate as the 
number of shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding and average it 
over a three-month period. Their paper motivates a new measure to use due to overall 
scarceness of bid-ask spread data for longer periods and propose that the turnover rate 
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might be a better proxy for transaction costs. Also, the data for calculating the turnover 
rate is relatively easier to obtain for a large number of stocks and for long periods of 
time. Datar et al. (1998) test whether there is a negative relation between stock returns 
and liquidity. The paper’s hypothesis is derived from the logic used by Amhud and 
Mendelson (1986) implying that expected assets returns increase by the expected 
holding period; Datar et al. (1998) therefore hypothesize that asset returns must be a 
decreasing function of the turnover rate of the asset in question. The paper uses data 
from 1962 to 1991 from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Datar et al. (1998) 
find that their liquidity measure, the turnover rate, is significantly negatively related to 
stock returns. The inference from the result is that illiquid stocks offer higher average 
returns compared to more liquid stocks. 
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6. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the empirical framework for the statistical 
testing conducted. The data description gives an insight into the data sources used and 
details on the sample and timeframe. An introduction to the statistical methodology 
applied is also included in order to discuss the different statistical variables used in the 
empirics. The chosen variables are ultimately backed up by the previous literature 
closely related to the topic. The descriptive statistics will describe some aspects of the 
data, for example, the differentiations between the three sample sets. Chapter six also 
answers the first hypothesis made at the beginning of the thesis.  
 
 
6.1. Data description 
 
The financial data was acquired from Thomson Reuters Worldscope database. This data 
contains all companies listed in the Nasdaq OMX Helsinki Stock Exchange between 
2001 and 2014 and totaled for 237 companies including all currently listed but also all 
delisted companies. The time period 2001 and 2014 was selected since the first GRI 
guideline was published in 2000 and in Finland the first responsibility reports following 
the guideline were released in 2001. The financial data available at the time of writing 
was limited to the year 2014. The timeframe selected gives an opportunity to investigate 
the GRI report releases and possible effects from the first year onwards when Finnish 
companies applied the guideline. The most relevant financial variables obtained were 
market capitalization, number of shares outstanding, share turnover, stock price, 
leverage ratio (% total debt by common equity), return on invested capital (ROIC) and 
industry classifications. In order for the sample companies to have statistically sufficient 
amount of data the financial data was sorted by the requirement of available financial 
information for the year the first GRI report was published and four consecutive years 
after the publication. Companies without GRI reports had to have five consecutive years 
of data. The process of calculating the main dependent variable for the empirical 
regressions, the turnover rate, further eliminated the scope of the data. Share turnover 
rate was chosen as the main dependent variable due to being proven as a robust measure 
by previous studies (see e.g. Datar et al. 1998; Petersen & Plenborg 2006). The dataset 
was left with 117 sample companies, which together form the base for further empirical 
testing.  
 
The second dataset was collected from the Sustainability Disclosure Database, which is 
maintained by the Global Reporting Initiative. This database was used to collect 
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information on companies that have published their first GRI sustainability report 
between the years 2001 and 2014. Both standalone reports and publications within an 
annual report were taken into account if they had been conducted by the GRI guidelines 
or at least referenced the guidelines. Such annotations were available at the database. 
All versions of the guideline were accepted, that is G1–G4. Companies publishing any 
responsibility reports, GRI or non-GRI based, are individually responsible for uploading 
their reports to the Sustainability Disclosure Database. In the case of Finnish companies 
the activity level of uploading material to the database was found to be high and a 
comprehensive amount of publishing data was collected from the database. To test for 
the robustness of the data collected any companies that did now have a report in the 
Sustainability Disclosure Database had their websites manually checked for GRI 
sustainability reports. Altogether 41 companies of the 117 companies with financial 
data available had published their first GRI report in 2001–2014. Furthermore, 
companies’ website archives were used to collect the exact month each 41 initiating 
GRI reports were published.  
 
By only including the event when a company first published or initiated a GRI report it 
was guaranteed that an event study based methodology could be applied in the empirical 
part of the thesis. Also, this perspective aims to minimize the institutionalizing effects 
GRI reporting practices were found to have in some studies presented in chapter four. 
The first release of a GRI report can additionally be seen as a new commitment towards 
increased information disclosure suggested after reviewing the paper by Leuz and 
Verrecchia (2000). As seen in Figure 3 the initiating reports spread well over the 
observed time period with 2012 differentiating as a cluster. It is to be noted that since 
the financial dataset required five years of consistent values, the reporting sample is 
omitted of companies that have only recently been listed in the target stock exchange. 
This makes the data used biased against companies recently available to public trading 
with or without GRI reports. The research is continued despite of this bias, which is 
alleviated by having considerable amount of years and GRI reports published in the 
time period utilized.  
 
Table 1 represents division of industries by which the initiating GRI reports were 
published. The industry classification is based on the financial data acquired from 
Thomson Reuters Worldscope database but is slightly trimmed to suit the purpose of 
this thesis. Appendix 1 shows the specific company-industry classifications used as well  
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Figure 3. Released GRI reports between 2001 and 2014. The spread of first time 
releases of GRI reports by companies listed in the Nasdaq OMX Helsinki Stock 
Exchange between 2001 and 2014. Below the graph are the release years of the G1-G4 
versions of the GRI guidelines.  
 
 
Table 1. Released GRI reports by industries. Initiating GRI reports’ distribution by 
industry and industry’s proportion of all reports in the dataset. 
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  G4	  
            
  
No. Of 
Companies 
Initial GRI 
reports 
% All 
reports 
Industry 
publishing rate 
 
Industry 
1 Construction 7 2 4,9 % 28,6 % 
2 Electrical 1 1 2,4 % 100,0 % 
3 Electronic and Electrical Equipment 10 2 4,9 % 20,0 % 
4 Finance 8 1 2,4 % 12,5 % 
5 Food and retail 11 7 17,1 % 63,6 % 
6 Forestry 4 4 9,8 % 100,0 % 
7 Healthcare 6 1 2,4 % 16,7 % 
8 Industrial 23 13 31,7 % 56,5 % 
9 Information technology 23 3 7,3 % 13,0 % 
10 Media 7 1 2,4 % 14,3 % 
11 Mining 2 1 2,4 % 50,0 % 
12 Real Estate 3 3 7,3 % 100,0 % 
13 Support Services 8 1 2,4 % 12,5 % 
14 Travel and Leisure 4 1 2,4 % 25,0 % 
  Grand Total 117 41 100,0 % 35,0 % 
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as the release years of the GRI reports for the 41 companies. In the first draft there were 
altogether 30 industries, which were reduced down to 14 by combining very similar 
industries into bigger groups. Industrial and information technology groups represent 
the biggest industries in the sample with 23 companies each. The food and retail group 
with electronic and electrical equipment group represent the third and fourth largest 
industry sectors in the sample. Due to the relatively small size of the Helsinki stock 
exchange some industry groups are left with only one or two individual companies 
representing the whole industry. 
 
In total the industrial group has the highest amount of GRI reports in the sample (13). 
The column % All Reports is the rate of published GRI reports per industry against the 
total of 41. This rate tells how many percent of the total reports were contributed by 
each industry. Since this measure is highly influenced by the industry size the table also 
has a publishing rate –measure. This is the amount of GRI reports in an industry divided 
by the amount of individual companies within that industry. Even though this measure 
too is affected by the small sizes of some industries it gives a new insight. Three 
industry groups, namely electrical, forestry and real estate have a 100% publishing rate. 
It is notable that Table 1 should be read with some precaution since such simple rates 
cannot be used for comprehensive industry analysis due to a small sample in several of 
the industry groups. However, Table 1 gives a good summation of how the published 
GRI reports are divided between industries during 2001–2014.  
 
Before moving to the empirical analysis, Figure 3 and Table 1 provide a basis for some 
inference on the first research question made in this thesis. In addition to examining the 
effects of GRI reporting on information asymmetry this thesis aims to analyze the 
evolution of GRI reporting in Finland and in the Nasdaq OMX Helsinki Stock 
Exchange during the sample period. As mentioned previously the first GRI reporting 
standard, the G1, was published in 2000 so the time period utilized here is a good 
representation of how the GRI reporting standard has evolved in Finland during its 
existence. By taking a look at Figure 3 one can see that new GRI reports have 
consistently been published by the Helsinki Stock Exchange companies during 2001–
2014 with 2002 standing out as an exception with zero initiating reports. In 2001 three 
companies were the forerunners of GRI reports in Finland. These three do indeed 
include some of the most influential companies listed in Helsinki, such as Nokia, which 
at the time was among the leading companies in mobile devices and networks. The 
amount of new companies publishing a GRI report remained subtle all the way to 2007. 
In 2008 the amount of new publishers began to rise and it peaked in 2012 with 12 new 
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companies publishing their first GRI report. One reason for such a peak might be the 
launch of the G3.1 guidelines in 2011 by the GRI. The launch of the G3.1 offered 
expanded guidance on such areas as gender, community and human rights –related 
performance (GRI 2015). By the end of 2014 altogether 41 companies out of the 117 or 
35,0% had at least once published a GRI report. The Global reporting initiative’s 
sustainable reports have therefore gained a mentionable foothold in the Finnish 
reporting practices for being a voluntary reporting standard. 
 
 
6.2. Statistical methodology  
 
This section introduces the construction of the pooled cross-sectional dataset used in the 
empirical analysis as well as the empirical methodology applied. The variables included 
in the dataset were matched against a company and month and pooled together resulting 
in pooled cross-sectional dataset. Altogether three datasets were created, the first 
representing the entire sample including all companies and every year of the collected 
data. Thereafter two datasets were created where the other included only companies that 
published a GRI report during 2001 to 2014 whereas the other dataset included all the 
non-publishers. These three datasets were used to run the descriptive statistics. The data 
was winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to discard some extreme outliers present in 
the data.  
 
An empirical analysis is conducted to answer the second hypothesis: Releasing the GRI 
responsibility report for the first time lowers information asymmetry for companies 
listed in Nasdaq OMX Helsinki Stock Exchange between 2001 and 2014. More 
specifically, the possible effects in information asymmetry are studied for six months 
after publishing the report. Such approach attempts to account for the long-term effects 
the publication might have and is motivated by the commitment corporations inevitably 
make by releasing the first report. Here, a gri variable is regressed on the information 
asymmetry proxy variable: the liquidity measure turnover rate. The gri variable aims to 
account for possible variations in the turnover rate. The variable is assigned a value of 1 
for the release month and also the five consecutive months. Otherwise the value is zero. 
The chosen proxy for information asymmetry, the turnover rate, is calculated monthly 
for each firm in the sample by dividing the volume of shares traded during each month 
by the amount of outstanding shares by the end of that year. This variable is presented 
as to in the regression. The method for calculating the turnover rate is similar to that of 
Datar et al. (1998). The statistical testing in conducted by running the panel regression: 
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(1) 𝑡𝑜!,! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑔𝑟𝑖!,! + 𝛽!𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒!,! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑒𝑣!,!  +  𝛽!𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒!,!  +  𝛽!𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑐!,! + 𝜀!,!, 
 
with period and cross-sectional fixed effects. This is done to account for the 
unobservable differences between the companies and variations in their environment 
during the years. The variable to represents the turnover rate, 𝛽! represents the intercept 
and 𝛽! −   𝛽! represent the slope coefficients for the independent variable gri and the 
control variables. The variable 𝜀!,! is the error term. According to previous literature on 
voluntary disclosure some speculation has been made that bigger companies would be 
more active in social reporting (McGuire, Sundgren & Schneeweis 1988; Diamond & 
Verrecchia 1991; Waddock & Graves 1997). Therefore control variable for size is 
included in the regression. In this case the variable for size is the natural logarithm of 
market capitalization for each i and it is calculated annually. Additionally, the 
regression controls for leverage measured as % total debt by common equity (lev) as 
well as for price, which is the monthly closing stock price for each firm (price). These 
control variables are similar to those applied by Cho, Lee and Pfeiffer (2013). In 
addition to the control variables presented by Cho et al. (2013), a variable representing 
firm profitability was added to account for the slack resource theory. The theory states 
that when businesses have better financial performance they are more inclined to invest 
in corporate responsibility due to better availability of resources (Waddock & Graves 
1997). Profitability is measured by return on invested capital (roic), similarly to 
Petersen & Plenborg (2006). The purpose of the control variables are to examine the 
differences between publishing and non-publishing companies in the descriptive 
statistics as well as to control for these variable-effects in the regression to increase the 
robustness of the results. 
  
58 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics:  
Panel A shows descriptive statistics for the whole sample data from 2001 to 2014. 
Panel B shows descriptive statistics for firms with a GRI report from 2001 to 2014. 
Panel C shows descriptive statistics for firms without a GRI report from 2001 to 2014. 
Panel D shows results of tests of difference in key variables of firms with and without a GRI 
report. Data is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Significance of difference in means is 
tested with a t-test and in medians with a Wilcoxon signed rank test. *** Statistical significance 
at the 0,01 level. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Panel A: Full Sample (n=17 996)    
 Mean Std dev Min Median Max 
to 0,043 0,061 0,000 0,021 0,755 
size 12,034 1,941 7,398 11,910 18,440 
lev 0,850 1,839 -11,945 0,557 25,923 
price 7,863 8,171 0,031 5,000 56,123 
roic 
 
0,052 0,289 -4,268 0,073 1,674 
Panel B:    Firms with GRI report (n=6 504)   
 Mean Std dev Min Median Max 
to 0,069 0,073 0,000 0,047 0,755 
size 13,585 1,633 9,224 13,633 18,440 
lev 1,038 1,759 -7,731 0,637 17,300 
price 11,022 9,567 0,031 8,332 56,123 
roic 
 
0,097 0,157 -1,684 0,081 1,674 
Panel C: Firms without GRI report (n=11 556)   
 Mean Std dev Min Median Max 
to 0,029 0,048 0,000 0,014 0,755 
size 11,192 1,533 7,398 11,121 16,894 
lev 0,743 1,874 -11,941 0,514 25,923 
price 6,252 6,810 0,031 3,725 56,123 
roic 0,026 0,339 -4,268 0,069 1,674 
      
Panel D:    Difference tests between firms with and without GRI report. 
 t-test  Wilcoxon   
to -44,16***  51,77***   
size -98,14***  80,06***   
lev -10,55***  14,20***   
price -39,37***  37,92***   
roic -15,87***  16,58***   
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7. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
In table 2 are reported the descriptive statistics with separate sections for the whole 
sample and firms with a published GRI report as well as for firms with no GRI report.  
With such division in the descriptive statistics one can examine the differences between 
GRI firms and non-GRI firms. In the table to represents the turnover rate and size the 
natural logarithm of market capitalization for each firm, lev is the leverage variable, 
price the variable for stock monthly closing price and roic describes profitability as 
return on invested capital. The full sample consisted of 117 companies and as shown in 
table 2 the average amount of shares traded per all outstanding shares for each company 
was 4,3% monthly during 2001–2014. When compared against GRI and non-GRI firms 
the mean turnover rate was 6,9% and 2,9% respectively. Therefore, firms with an 
initiating GRI report had proportionally more shares traded per month than firms with 
no initiating GRI reports. Also, the differentiating tests confirm that the two samples 
have statistically different turnovers measured by t-test and Wilcoxon signed rank test. 
Also, all the control variables size, lev, price and roic prove to be statistically different 
between the firms with and without a GRI report in 2001–2014. This result supports that 
firms that released a first GRI report had higher market capitalization, were traded with 
a higher price, were more leveraged and more profitable measured by return on invested 
capital. The information presented in the descriptive statistics is consistent with the 
studies by Dhaliwal et al. (2011) and Cho et al. (2013) except for the leverage ratio. 
Even though the GRI publishers were on average more leveraged, the non-publishers 
had more extreme minimum and maximum values of leverage. Without data 
winsorization the variable lev was not significantly different between the datasets. All 
the other control variables remained with unchanged interpretation.  
 
In Table 3 are shown the results of the empirical regression. The applied dataset 
included monthly data between 2001 and 2014 and only for firms with an initiating GRI 
report between the years. The aim was to examine the effects of releasing a GRI report 
on information asymmetry.  In Table 3 statistically significant variables in determining 
the turnover rate are firm size, leverage, price and firm profitability thus indicating no 
statistically significant long-term increase in share turnover rate as a result of releasing a 
first GRI report.  The results do not support the second hypothesis of this study, which 
suggested that publishing a first GRI corporate responsibility report would lower firm 
information asymmetry in the financial markets. 
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Table 3. Statistical results. Test of the effect of releasing a first GRI report on 
information asymmetry. Model A tests for long-term effects in turnover rate by the release of 
an initiating GRI report. Here gri = 1 the month and five consecutive months of releasing a GRI 
report. Model A includes years 2001 and 2014 for all sample companies with an initiating GRI 
report in the timeperiod. **Statistical significance at the 0,05 level. ***Statistical significance at 
the 0,01 level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Model A: Long-term effects in turnover rate (n=5868) 
 Coefficient  (t-statistics) 
intercept 0,200  (7,90)*** 
gri -0,004  (-1,32) 
size -0,010  (-5,35)*** 
lev -0,002  (-1,77)** 
price -0,001  (5,43)*** 
roic 0,025  (3,45)*** 
R2 
 
0,59   
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to examine the informational value of responsible reports 
constructed by following the Global reporting initiative’s reporting framework. The 
main motive behind this research was the new directive 2014/95/EU that was passed in 
2014 by the European Commission by which responsible disclosures will go under 
regulation for the largest listed companies in 2017 in the EU. Since the Global reporting 
initiative is currently the most widely recognized reporting practice it will most likely 
continue to attract companies committing to the framework when the new EC’s 
directive comes into effect. In terms of academic literature this thesis is closely related 
to research in voluntary disclosure, information asymmetry and corporate social 
responsibility. 
 
This study offered an extensive review on the literature in voluntary disclosure, 
information asymmetry, corporate social responsibility and corporate responsible 
reporting. The intention was to give a comprehensive view of the different topics related 
to the purpose of the thesis. In the review it was shown how the different areas have 
evolved in academic literature and how they are intertwined in the context of this thesis. 
After reviewing the most relevant previous literature, corporate social responsibility 
literature and responsible reporting literature the thesis continued by introducing some 
of the financial literature connected to the topic. This financial literature covered 
phenomena often discussed by academics around the areas of corporate voluntary 
disclosures, information asymmetry and liquidity. 
 
An empirical study examining the informational value of an initiating GRI report was 
conducted beginning in chapter six with a description of the data and empirical 
methodology next to some descriptive statistics. The data included selected financial 
variables from listed companies in the Nasdaq OMX Helsinki Stock exchange from 
2001 to 2014 as well as data on the released GRI reports by the listed companies in the 
same timeframe. The aim was to examine whether the initiation of a GRI report lowered 
firm information asymmetry by increasing its market liquidity measured by the turnover 
rate. Also, the data offered grounds to examine how the GRI reporting practices had 
evolved in Finland between 2001 and 2014. The descriptive statistics showed that 
companies with an initiating GRI report during the timeframe had higher stock turnover 
rate, were bigger measured by market capitalization, were more leveraged, were traded 
with a higher price and had better profitability measured by return on invested capital. 
The data also showed that from the first year the GRI framework was available to the 
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last year included in the data the amount of firms disclosing the report increased from 
three initial reports in 2001 to 41 initiations between 2001 and 2014 which was 35% of 
the 117 companies included in the sample.  
 
In the empirical regression the act of initiating a GRI report was regressed on the 
turnover variable with additional control variables for size, leverage, price, and 
profitability. The empirical results could not confirm that initiating a GRI report 
affected share turnover rate. This result supports the conclusion that the GRI report does 
not lower information asymmetry when it is measured by the liquidity variable turnover 
rate. The inference from such result is that investors might not recognize the GRI report 
as a valuable informational source when making investment decisions in Finland. 
However, the circumstances from where the corporate social disclosure theory stems 
from may offer some explanation to the result. It can be that GRI has not been able to 
establish a credible role in being a relevant corporate disclosure and the reason for this 
can be speculated to lie in the root problems corporate responsibility is based on.  
 
Corporate responsibility has suffered from measurability issues since its inception and 
theories such as greenwashing have further aggravated the situation. Corporate social 
responsibility and responsible reporting have long been regarded as voluntary acts with 
little scrutiny from regulatory entities. The fact that the contents reported within a GRI 
report do not undergo any kind of auditing or third-party verification when it comes to 
the truthfulness of what is reported is a crucial issue in the reporting framework. This 
leaves the framework vulnerable to corporate misuse in the attempt to enhance 
corporate image or even to greenwash. As long as such abuse of the GRI framework is 
an aspect to be concerned about, that is as long as the reports relying on the framework 
are not thoroughly audited, the framework cannot be considered a relevant source of 
information in investment decisions. The closest real life example of such misuse of the 
GRI framework was seen in Finland when the mining company Talvivaara Plc. was 
responsible for an environmental catastrophe in northern Finland and the company has 
since been charged with environmental endangerment in 2013. Talvivaara Plc. initiated 
its first GRI report only one year earlier in 2012.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1. Sample companies, industries and GRI publication year. 
All 117 Nasdaq OMX Helsinki Stock Exchange sample companies, their respective 
industries and division to GRI and non-GRI companies along with the first release year 
of the GRI report. 
 
Company name Sector GRI Year 
Afarak Group Mining No 
 Affecto Information technology No 
 Ahlstrom Forestry Yes 2003 
Aktia 'A' Finance Yes 2012 
Alandsbanken 'A' Finance No 
 Aldata Solutions Information technology No 
 Alma Media Media Yes 2010 
American Sports Travel and Leisure No 
 Apetit Food and retail No 
 Aspo Group Electronic and Electrical Equipment No 
 Aspocomp Group Electronic and Electrical Equipment No 
 Atria 'A' Food and retail Yes 2012 
Basware Information technology No 
 Biohit 'B' Healthcare No 
 Biotie Therapies Healthcare No 
 Capman 'B' Finance No 
 Cargotec 'B' Industrial Yes 2012 
Cencorp Electronic and Electrical Equipment No 
 Citycon Real Estate Yes 2010 
Componenta Industrial Yes 2008 
Comptel Information technology No 
 Cramo Support Services No 
 Digia Information technology No 
 Dovre Group Support Services No 
 Efore Electronic and Electrical Equipment No 
 Elecster 'A' Industrial No 
 Elektrobit Information technology No 
 Elisa Information technology Yes 2012 
Equity Finance No 
 Equity Corporation Finance No 
 Etteplan Support Services No 
 Evia Media No 
 Exel Composites Industrial No 
 Finnair Travel and Leisure Yes 2009 
Finnlines Industrial No 
 Fiskars 'A' Food and retail No 
 Fortum Electrical Yes 2006 
F-Secure Information technology No 
 Glaston Construction No 
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Hkscan 'A' Food and retail No 
 Honkarakenne 'B' Construction No 
 Huhtamaki Industrial No 
 Ilkka Yhtyma Media No 
 Incap Electronic and Electrical Equipment No 
 Innofactor Information technology No 
 Ixonos Information technology No 
 Kemira Industrial Yes 2011 
Keskisuomalainen Media No 
 Kesko 'B' Food and retail Yes 2001 
Kesla 'A' Industrial No 
 Kone 'B' Industrial Yes 2008 
Konecranes Industrial Yes 2009 
Lassila and Tikanoja Support Services Yes 2012 
Lemminkainen Construction Yes 2012 
Marimekko Food and retail Yes 2012 
Martela 'A' Food and retail Yes 2011 
Metsa Board 'B' Forestry Yes 2007 
Metso Industrial Yes 2005 
Neo Industrial 'B' Electronic and Electrical Equipment No 
 Neste Oil Industrial Yes 2010 
Nokia Information technology Yes 2001 
Nokian Renkaat Industrial Yes 2014 
Nurminen Logistics Industrial No 
 Okmetic Information technology No 
 Olvi 'A' Food and retail No 
 Oral Hammaslaakarit Healthcare No 
 Oriola-KD 'B' Healthcare No 
 Orion 'B' Healthcare Yes 2010 
Outokumpu 'A' Industrial Yes 2008 
Outotec Industrial Yes 2011 
Panostaja Finance No 
 Perlos Electronic and Electrical Equipment No 
 PKC Group Electronic and Electrical Equipment No 
 Pohjois-Karjalan Kirjapaino Media No 
 Ponsse Industrial No 
 Poyry Support Services No 
 QPR Software Information technology No 
 Raisio Food and retail Yes 2008 
Ramirent Industrial Yes 2013 
Rapala VMC Travel and Leisure No 
 Rautaruukki 'K' Industrial Yes 2004 
Raute 'A' Industrial No 
 Revenio Group Healthcare No 
 Rocla Industrial No 
 Saga Furs Food and retail Yes 2012 
Sampo 'A' Finance No 
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Sanoma Media No 
 Sentera Information technology No 
 Sievi Capital Finance No 
 Solteq Information technology No 
 Soprano Information technology No 
 Sponda Real Estate Yes 2012 
SRV Yhtiot Construction No 
 SSH Communications Information technology No 
 Stockmann 'B' Food and retail Yes 2010 
Stonesoft Information technology No 
 Stora Enso 'R' Forestry Yes 2003 
Suominen Industrial No 
 Takoma Support Services No 
 Talentum Media No 
 Talvivaara Mining Yes 2012 
Technopolis Real Estate Yes 2012 
Tecnotree Information technology No 
 Tekla Information technology No 
 Teleste Information technology No 
 Tieto OYJ Information technology Yes 2011 
Trainers House Information technology No 
 Tulikivi 'A' Construction No 
 Turvatiimi Support Services No 
 UPM-Kymmene Forestry Yes 2003 
Uponor Construction No 
 Vacon Electronic and Electrical Equipment Yes 2012 
Vaisala 'A' Electronic and Electrical Equipment Yes 2009 
Wartsila Industrial Yes 2001 
Viking Line Travel and Leisure No 
 Wulff-Group Support Services No 
 YIT Construction Yes 2013 
 
